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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
The present case is Wasatch County's appeal to the Utah Supreme Court of 
the district court's Order Granting Warren and Tricia Osborn's Motion to Dismiss 
Wasatch County's Petition for Review of the Utah State Tax Commission's Final 
Order issued April 1, 2008 for lack of jurisdiction. Appellant Wasatch County 
(the "County") filed its Petition for Review in district court after having filed a 
separate and prior Cross-Petition for Review of the Tax Commission's Final 
Decision in the Utah Supreme Court. A copy of the district court's Order is 
attached as Addendum 2 to this brief. A copy of the Tax Commission's Final 
Decision is attached as Addendum 3. 
The Utah Supreme Court had jurisdiction to decide this case, Case No. 
20080732-CA, pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78A-3-102(3)(k)(appeals from 
district court). The Supreme Court transferred the County's appeal of the district 
court Order to this Court pursuant to Rule 42(a) of the Utah Rules of Appellate 
Procedure. This Court has jurisdiction to decide the County's appeal pursuant to 
Utah Code Ann. § 78A-4-103(2)(j)(cases transferred to the Court of Appeals from 
the Supreme Court). 
This Court also has jurisdiction to decide Petitioner/Appellees' Warren and 
Tricia Osborn et al (the 'Taxpayers") request for attorneys' fees pursuant to Rule 
33 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. 
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STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 
Issue I - The District Court Dismissal of the County's Second Appeal 
The Taxpayers dispute the County's framing of the issue this Court must 
decide. The County attempts to distort the sole issue of this appeal by incorrectly 
assuming in its favor that Utah Code Ann. § 59-1-602 ("Section 602") permits the 
filing of what the County's brief labels as the County's "protective" appeal of the 
Utah State Tax Commission's Final Decision issued April 1, 2008 to the Utah 
Supreme Court. In truth, there is neither express nor implied authorization in 
Section 602 for a so-called "protective" appeal of the Tax Commission's Final 
Decision, which the County filed in the Utah Supreme Court before filing a second 
appeal in the district court. Further, the County's claim that its first Cross-Petition 
for Review filed in the Supreme Court was a so called "protective" appeal is not 
factually supported by the record. 
Given the County's false premise - that the County's first Cross-Petition for 
Review was a "protective" appeal and that "protective" appeals are permitted 
under Section 602 despite express statutory language to the contrary - the County 
now claims that the issue before this Court is whether the district court properly 
decided that the County's "protective" filing of a cross petition for review of the 
Tax Commission's Final Decision in the Utah Supreme Court deprived the district 
court of jurisdiction. County Brief at 1. 
Contrary to the County's invented "protective" appeal premise, Section 602 
clearly states that a county or taxpayer appearing before the Tax Commission 
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"may at that party's option petition for judicial review in the district court 
pursuant to this section, or in the Supreme Court or the Court of Appeals pursuant 
to Section 59-1-610." (Emphasis added.) Hence, a more accurate statement of the 
issue this Court must decide is as follows: 
Taxpayers1 Restatement of Issue I 
Given the express language of Utah Code Ann. § 59-l-602(l)(a), providing 
that a "county whose revenues are affected" by a Tax Commission final decision 
has the "option" of petitioning for review of the decision before the district court 
"or" the Utah Supreme Court, did District Court Judge Kennedy properly dismiss 
the County's second-filed Petition for Review of the Tax Commission's April 1, 
2008 Final Decision because the County had already elected its remedy by 
exercising its "option" to file a prior Petition for Review of the same Tax 
Commission Final Decision in the Utah Supreme Court? 
Taxpayers' Issue II - Rule 33 Claim for Attorneys' Fees - The County 
Appeal is "Frivolous," 
Is the County's appeal to this Court of the district court's dismissal of its 
second appeal of the Tax Commission's Final Decision a "frivolous" appeal, an 
appeal "not warranted by existing law, or not based on a good faith argument to 
extend, modify or reverse existing law," which justifies an award of attorney's 
fees and costs against the County and in favor of the Taxpayers, pursuant to Rule 
33 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure? 
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STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Issue I 
Whether the district court properly dismissed the County's second appeal of 
the Tax Commission's April 1, 2008 Final Decision for lack of jurisdiction after 
the County had previously filed an appeal with the Utah Supreme Court "presents 
a question of law, which we review for correctness." Ameritemps, Inc v. Labor 
Comm yn, 2005 UT App 491, t 7, 128 P.3d 31. 
Issue II 
This Court held in O'Brien v. Rusk 744 P.2d 306, 310 (Utah Ct. App. 1987) 
that "a frivolous appeal is one without merit." Whether the County's appeal of the 
district court's dismissal of the County's second appeal of the Tax Commission 
Final Decision is "without merit" is a question of law, pursuant to Rule 33 of the 
Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, which provides for recovery of attorney's fees 
and either single or double costs for appeals lacking merit. 
DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISION 
Utah Constitution, Article XIII, Section 6(4): 
Notwithstanding the powers granted to the State Tax 
Commission in this Constitution, the Legislature may by statute 
authorize any court established under Article VIII to adjudicate, 
review, reconsider, or determine any matter decided by the State Tax 
Commission relating to revenue and taxation. 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES 
1. Utah Code Ann. § 59-1-601 (district court jurisdiction over appeals 
from Tax Commission final decisions in a "trial de novo," defined in Section 
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601(2) as an "original, independent proceeding and does not mean a trial on the 
record.1'). 
2. Utah Code Ann. § 59-1-602 (vesting an "aggrieved party" or 
affected county appearing before the Tax Commission with the "option" to appeal 
to the district court "or" an appellate court). 
3. Rule 33 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure (Damages for 
delay or frivolous appeal; recovery of attorney's fees). 
In addition to the above-cited constitutional provision and statutes, the 
County cites Rule 1(c) and Rule 14 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure as 
determinative rules. However, neither of these rules is determinative or even 
relevant in deciding whether the district court properly dismissed the County's 
second appeal of the Tax Commission's Final Decision. Even assuming, 
hypothetically, that the district court had jurisdiction to conduct a trial "de novo" 
on the County's second appeal as an "original and independent proceeding," such 
trials are not and cannot be conducted under the Utah Rules of Appellate 
Procedure. 
Rule 33 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure applies because the 
County's appeal of the district court's Order of Dismissal before this Court is not 
warranted by existing law, but rather requests that this Court modify or reverse 
Utah statutory law. There is no good faith argument to be made that this Court has 
jurisdiction to amend a Utah statute. Hence, attorney's fees and double costs 
should be awarded to Taxpayers. 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
As referenced under the ^Jurisdiction" section of this brief, the County's 
present appeal before this Court is of the district court's Order Granting 
Appellees' Motion to Dismiss the County's second-filed Petition for Review for 
lack of jurisdiction, which County petition sought district court review of the Utah 
State Tax Commission's Final Order issued April 1, 2008. The County filed its 
second Petition for Review in district court after having filed a separate and prior 
Cross-Petition for Review of the Tax Commission's Final Decision in the Utah 
Supreme Court. 
PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND AND RELEVANT FACTS 
1. On April 1, 2008, the Tax Commission issued its Final Decision in 
Osborn et al v. Board of Equalization of Wasatch County, Appeal No. 06-1504. 
(R. at 26.) Subsequent to entry of the Tax Commission's Final Decision, the 
Taxpayers filed their Petition for Review of the Tax Commission's Final Decision 
with the Utah Supreme Court on April 10, 2008, Case No. 20080304- CA. (R. at 
94.) On April 29, 2008, the Utah Supreme Court transferred the Taxpayers' 
appeal of the Tax Commission's Final Decision to the Utah Court of Appeals. (R. 
at 95.) 
2. The County then filed a Cross-Petition for Review of the Tax 
Commission's Final Decision with the Utah Supreme Court on April 24, 2008 
("First Petition for Review") in the same case, thereby exercising its statutory 
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^option" of seeking review of the Final Decision in either the district court or the 
Utah Court of Appeals or the Utah Supreme Court. (R. at 94.) 
3- Contrary to the plain language of Utah Code Ann. § 59-l-602(l)(a), 
the County then filed a second Petition for Review in the district court on April 25, 
2008 ("Second Petition for Review"). Id. 
4. On April 30, 2008 the County filed its first Motion to Stay Case No. 
20080304-CA, in which the County filed its First Petition for Review of the Tax 
Commission's Final Decision initially filed with the Utah Supreme Court and later 
transferred to this Court. (R. at 129-130.) 
5. The County's first Motion to Stay requested that this Court stay 
proceedings on the Taxpayers' Petition for Review and the County's First Petition 
for Review in Case No. 2008034-CA, pending disposition of the County's Second 
Petition for Review filed in the district court. On June 4, 2008, this Court granted 
the County's Motion to Stay in Case No. 20080304-CA pending disposition of the 
County's Second Petition for Review in the district court. Id. 
6. In the Order granting the County's first Motion to Stay, this Court 
stated in pertinent part: 
[Wasatch County's second Petition for Review] seeks de 
novo review of the same order of the Utah State Tax 
Commission pursuant to Utah Code section 59-1-601 (2006); 
see also Utah Code Ann. §59-1-602(1 )(a) (2006) (allowing a 
party the option to petition for judicial review of a decision of 
the Utah State Tax Commission in either the district court or 
the appellate court) 
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Id. (emphasis added). 
7. On May 20, 2008, the Taxpayers filed a Motion to Intervene and a 
Motion to Dismiss in the district court action in response to the County's Second 
Petition for Review. (R. at 2*1.) The Taxpayers' motion sought dismissal of the 
County's Second Petition for Review filed in the district court for lack of 
jurisdiction. (R. at 7-24*.) District Court Judge John Paul Kennedy heard oral 
argument on the Taxpayers' Motion to Dismiss on July 14, 2008, and again at a 
second hearing on July 28, 2008. (R. at 94.) On August 1, 2008 Judge Kennedy 
entered his Order of Dismissal, a copy of which is attached as Addendum 2 to this 
brief. (R. at 206.)The district court's Order of Dismissal states in pertinent part: 
Utah Code Ann. § 59-1-602 provides that "any aggrieved 
party appearing before the commission or county whose tax 
revenues are affected by the decision," including Wasatch 
County, has the "option" of filing a petition for review in the 
district court "or" in the Supreme Court. Wasatch County 
exercised its statutory option pursuant to Utah Code Ann. 
§ 59-1-602(a)(1) by invoking the jurisdiction of the court of 
its choice, the Utah Supreme Court, by filing its Cross-
Petition for Review with the Utah Supreme Court on April 
24, 2008. Consequently, Wasatch County's subsequent 
attempt to invoke the jurisdiction of this Court by filing its 
Petition for Review on April 25, 2008 failed to invoke this 
Court's jurisdiction and was in violation of Utah Code Ann. 
§ 59-1-602(a)(1). Because this Court lacks jurisdiction to 
adjudicate Wasatch County's subsequently filed appeal with 
this Court, it retains jurisdiction only to dismiss Wasatch 
County's Petition for Review. 
(R. at 205.). 
The Record is numbered 1-39, then starts again with numbering from 1-214. 
Therefore, for clarity, cites to the second pages 1-39 will be denoted with a *). 
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9. On June 4, 2008, this Court issued an Order of Stay in Case No. 
2008034-CA (the first appeal of the Tax Commission Final Decision before this 
Court) pending Judge Kennedy's disposition of the County's second appeal of the 
Tax Commission's Final Decision in the district court action, Case No. 
080907392, now Case No. 20080732-CA. (R. at 129-130.) Judge Kennedy's 
final Order of Dismissal in the County's second appeal of the Tax Commission's 
Final Decision (the district court action) mooted the reasons this Court issued Stay 
in Case No. 2008034-CA. Id Accordingly, this Court lifted its Stay on 
September 18,2008. 
10. On October 1, 2008, the County filed its second Motion to Stay with 
this Court, again requesting that this Court stay proceedings in district court Case 
No. 20080304-CA. The County's second Motion to Stay sought a delay of the 
Taxpayers' Petition for Review and the County's First Petition for Review until 
the County's appeal of the district court's Order of Dismissal, Case No. 20080732-
CA, is decided, essentially depriving Taxpayers of their right of appeal from the 
Tax Commission to this Court. 
11. On October 16, 2008, Taxpayers filed their Memorandum in 
Opposition to the County's Second Motion to Stay Appeal in this Court, in which 
Taxpayers argued that the County's appeal of the district court's Order of 
Dismissal was (and is) ripe for summary disposition by this Court, dismissing the 
County's appeal of the district court's Order, pursuant to Rule 10(e) of the Utah 
Rules of Appellate Procedure. Taxpayers argued that the County's appeal of the 
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district court's Order of Dismissal (Case No. 20080732-CA) is totally devoid of 
merit, and hence presents no substantial legal question. This Court did not act on 
the Taxpayers' request for summary disposition of the County's appeal of the 
district court's Order of Dismissal, but denied the County's second Motion to Stay 
on October 31,2008. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Utah Code Ann. § 59-1-602 provides that "any aggrieved party appearing 
before the commission or county whose tax revenues are affected by the decision," 
including the County, has the "option" of filing a petition for review in the district 
court "or" in the Supreme Court. The County exercised its statutory option 
pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 59-l-602(l)(a) by invoking the jurisdiction of the 
court of its choice, the Utah Supreme Court, by filing its Cross-Petition for 
Review with the Utah Supreme Court on April 24, 2008. Consequently, the 
County's subsequent attempt to invoke the jurisdiction of the district court by 
filing its Second Petition for Review on April 25, 2008 failed to invoke the 
jurisdiction of the district court and was in violation of Utah Code Ann. §59-1-
602(a)(1). 
The County attempts to confuse the sole issue in this appeal by claiming 
that Section 59-1-602 does not provide guidance for handling a disagreement 
among the parties as to the venue for appeal of a Tax Commission decision, and 
claims to have adhered to the proper procedure for invoking the district court's 
jurisdiction. The County's arguments are not relevant to this appeal because this 
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is not a case where the parties disagreed over the venue for an appeal of the Tax 
Commission's Final Decision. Rather, both parties exercised their statutory option 
in invoking the jurisdiction of the Utah Supreme Court by filing separate Petitions 
for Review in the Utah Supreme Court. The County attempts to frame the issue as 
whether one party's exercise of its statutory option pursuant to Utah Code Ann 
§59-1-602 can preempt another party's exercise of its statutory option pursuant to 
Utah Code Ann. §59-1-602. 
In so distorting the issue, the County ignores the plain language of Utah 
Code Ann. §59-1-602, and fabricates legal and factual positions that are not 
supported by Utah law or the record. Specifically, the County argues that its First 
Petition for Review was not an exercise of its statutory option, but rather was 
merely a "protective appeal." The County's "protective appeal" argument is 
unsupported by Utah law. Further, the County's First Petition for Review does not 
include any indication that it was in fact a "protective appeal," and such argument 
is unsupported by the record. 
Therefore, the County's appeal essentially requests a judicial amendment of 
Utah Code Ann. §59-1-602 to authorize the County's duplicative appeals to the 
Utah Supreme Court and the Utah district court. To the contrary, there is no good 
faith argument that this Court can or should amend Utah Code Ann. § 59-1-602 to 
cure the County's failure to comply with clear statutory law. Accordingly, this 
Court should dismiss the County's appeal of the district court's Order of 
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Dismissal, and award the Taxpayers their attorney fees and costs pursuant to Rule 
33 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. 
ARGUMENT 
L DISTRICT COURT JUDGE KENNEDY CORRECTLY HELD THAT 
THE COUNTY FORECLOSED ITSELF FROM A TRIAL DE NOVO 
BECAUSE THE COUNTY FAILED TO FOLLOW THE CLEAR 
PROCEDURES STATED IN UTAH CODE ANN. § 59-l-602(l)(a) BY 
FILING DUPLICATE AND PROSCRIBED APPEALS OF THE TAX 
COMMISSION'S FINAL DECISION. 
The County's brief is replete with omissions and misrepresentations of fact 
and law. To begin, the County's "Argument" section of its brief accurately quotes 
Utah Code Ann. §59-1-602: 
59-1-602, Right to appeal — Venue — County as party in 
interest 
(i) (a) Any aggrieved party appearing before the commission or 
county whose tax revenues are affected by the decision may at that 
party's option petition for judicial review in the district court 
pursuant to this section, or in the Supreme Court or the Court of 
Appeals pursuant to Section 59-1-610. 
(b) Judicial review of formal or informal adjudicative 
proceedings in the district is in the district court located in the 
county of residence or principal place of business of the affected 
taxpayer or, in the case of a taxpayer whose taxes are assessed on a 
statewide basis, to the Third Judicial District Court in and for Salt 
Lake County. 
(c) Notwithstanding Section 63G-4-402, a petition for review 
made to the district court under this section shall conform to the 
Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. 
(2) A county whose tax revenues are affected by the decision 
being reviewed shall be allowed to be a party in interest in the 
proceeding before the court. 
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County Brief at 7-8. (Emphasis added.) 
The County Brief omits a recitation of Utah Code Ann. §59-1-601 
("Section 601"), which provides: 
59-1-60L District court jurisdiction, 
(1) In addition to the jurisdiction granted in Section 63G-4-402, 
beginning July 1, 1994, the district court shall have jurisdiction to review 
by trial de novo all decisions issued by the commission after that date 
resulting from formal adjudicative proceedings. 
(2) As used in this section, "trial de novo" means an original, 
independent proceeding, and does not mean a trial de novo on the 
record. 
(3) (a) In any appeal to the district court pursuant to this section taken 
after January 1, 1997, the commission shall certify a record of its 
proceedings to the district court. 
(b) This Subsection (3) supercedes Section 63G-4-403 pertaining to 
judicial review of formal adjudicative proceedings. 
Utah Code Ann. §59-1-601 (Emphasis added.) 
Having accurately quoted Section 602, while omitting Section 601, the 
County's distortions begin. As the district court appropriately held, Section 
602(1 )(a) gives an aggrieved party the "option" of petitioning either the district 
court or an appellate court for review of the Tax Commission final decision, NOT 
BOTH, as the County did and now attempts to justify by distortions of law. The 
County's argument essentially urges this Court to rewrite Section 602(1 )(a) to 
"make sense" (meaning a rewrite of Section 602 so the County can file duplicate 
appeals) because, the County claims, the statute is nonsensical. County Brief at 8-
10, 
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The County's brief further claims, as did the County Attorney in the district 
court hearing, that "[Petitioner/Taxpayers'] counsel for the first time [at oral 
argument before the district court] mentioned that there was 'an issue' as to 
whether the county was entitled to exercise its right to district court review 
because the county had also elected to simultaneously participate in the Osborns' 
supreme court appeal arising from the same Tax Commission decision." County 
Brief at 5. 
The County misrepresented the facts to the district court and repeated its 
misrepresentation in its brief submitted to this Court As Osborns' counsel, Mr. 
Maxwell Miller, explained to the district court at oral argument: 
If you look at page twelve footnote three of our memorandum 
[Taxpayers' initial memorandum in support of its Motion to 
Dismiss], it says, and I quote, "it is clear that this Court has no 
jurisdiction to adjudicate Wasatch County's petition for review, 
because Wasatch County filed a cross-petition for review of the Tax 
Commission's final decision in the Utah Court of Appeals on April 
24, 2008 and then filed its petition for review on April 25, 2008 in 
this Court. Utah Code Ann. 59-1-602 provides any aggrieved party 
appearing before the Commission or County whose tax revenues are 
affected by the decision may at that party's option, petition for 
judicial review in the District Court pursuant to this section or in the 
Supreme Court or the Court of Appeals pursuant to Section 59-1-
610." 
(R. at 197.), Taxpayer Transcript at 18. 
2
 Rule 11(e)(2) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure provides "Transcript 
required of all evidence regarding challenged finding or conclusion. If the 
appellant intends to urge on appeal that a finding or conclusion is unsupported by 
or is contrary to the evidence, the appellant shall include in the record a transcript 
of all evidence relevant to such finding or conclusion. Neither the court nor the 
appellee is obligated to correct appellant's deficiencies in providing the relevant 
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Judge Kennedy then asked Mr. Miller, 'That was in the brief you filed 
where?" to which Mr. Miller replied, "In this Court." Record at 19. Judge 
Kennedy then asked the County Attorney, Thomas Low, "Well...what about, 
you're saying it's in a response? And therefore you don't have to pay any 
attention to it?" (R. at 198-199), Taxpayer Transcript at 19-20. 
To summarize, the County's initial misrepresentation is that the Taxpayers' 
jurisdictional issue had not been raised at the district court before oral argument, 
I 
when in fact, the issue had been raised multiple times. Yet precisely to moot the 
County's fained surprise over jurisdiction at the district court, Judge Kennedy 
extended the opportunity of a second hearing to the County so it could respond to 
the Taxpayers' jurisdictional arguments. Even though the County was given a 
second opportunity to address the Taxpayers' jurisdictional arguments, the County 
had no adequate rebuttal to the Taxpayers' arguments, because there is none. 
Accordingly, Judge Kennedy dismissed the County's unlawfully filed Second 
Petition for Review. 
portions of the transcript." (Emphasis added.) Taxpayers had an unofficial 
transcript of the district court proceedings prepared because the County abdicated 
its responsibility, even though its brief quotes from Taxpayers' Transcript and 
cites it as the "Record." The transcript the Taxpayers prepared is not the official 
"Transcript," but clearly shows Judge Kennedy's perceptive analysis and strong 
disapproval of the County's arguments. The transcript prepared by counsel for 
Taxpayers, a copy of which is attached as Addendum 4 hereto appears at R. 180-
207, and shall be referred to herein as Taxpayers' Transcript so as to avoid 
confusing it with the official transcript, which does not exist because the County 
failed to cause it to be prepared. 
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Another County misrepresentation is its "Certificate That No Transcript is 
Needed" in this case, which the County filed with this Court on September 26, 
2008. The County has now reversed itself by relying on portions of the unofficial 
transcript of the district court proceedings in its brief and citing it as the "Record." 
Counsel for Taxpayer had an unofficial transcript of the oral arguments before 
Judge Kennedy prepared because the County, whose duty it was to prepare the 
official transcript for its appeal of the district court's Order of Dismissal, failed to 
comply with such duty. 
To sustain its argument for a judicial rewrite of Section 602 so as to permit 
duplicate appeals by the same party, the County Brief argues that the statute, while 
generous in providing that all parties appearing before the Tax Commission have a 
right to appeal the Tax Commission's Final Decision, "is somewhat parsimonious 
in its guidance on how to sort through the conflicts that can arise from the parties' 
competing exercise of that discretion." County Brief at 8. Section 602 is not 
"parsimonious," even falsely assuming "parsimony" is a legitimate ground for 
ignoring express statutory language or rewriting the statute to suit the County's 
preferences. Neither does Section 602 fail to instruct parties on how to protect 
their standing in another party's appeal as the County further argues. Nor is there 
any competing exercise of discretion. Nor does the statute mandate, in the 
County's words, an "unforgiving procedure," id, at 9, as the County has further 
argued in an attempt to persuade this Court to ignore clear statutory language. 
Neither would this Court "sacrifice the county's right to obtain district court 
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review merely to preserve the appellees' right to continue their appeal before this 
Court (in case number 2008034), which right the appellees do not stand to lose 
anyway." Id at 12. 
Notwithstanding the County's arguments of hypothetical conflicts, the 
County, citing Park and Recreation Comm'n v. Dept of Finance, 388 P.2d 233, 
234 (Utah 1964), concludes Argument I of its brief by urging this Court to 
construe (essentially rewrite) a statute to make sense, if a statute is subject to more 
than one construction. Id. at 10. 
In response, Taxpayers stress that Section 602 already makes sense, is not 
ambiguous, and is not subject to multiple good faith constructions. As Judge 
Kennedy held: *'Wasatch County's subsequent attempt to invoke the jurisdiction of 
this Court by filing its [second] Petition for Review on April 25, 2008 failed to 
invoke this Court's jurisdiction and was in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 59-1-
602(a)." (R. at 205.) 
Again contrary to the County's misrepresentations, Taxpayers have no 
desire, nor could they ever, ^extinguish another's right to exercise the appellate 
option of that party's choice." County Brief at 8. Simply stated, the County's 
argument presents a hypothetical situation that is not relevant to the facts of this 
case. The County attempts to confuse the sole issue its appeal presents by 
claiming that each party is entitled to exercise its statutory option pursuant to Utah 
Code Ann. §59-1-602, and that one party's exercise of its statutory option cannot 
preempt another party's exercise of the same option. Id. The Taxpayers do not 
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disagree with this proposition, but that is not the issue the County's appeal 
presents. The County affirmatively exercised its statutory option by filing its First 
Petition for Review, and now requests that this Court authorize the filing of a 
second appeal, after the County already exercised its statutory option. This is not 
permitted by the plain and unambiguous language of Utah Code Ann. §59-1-602. 
The County has never been deprived of its right to a de novo trial in district 
court. The County has deprived itself of a trial de novo by failing to comply with 
Section 602 in filing two appeals instead of the statutorily mandated one appeal. 
As further argument for its request that this Court either ignore or rewrite Section 
602, the County postulates a hypothetical circumstance in which multiple parties 
at the Tax Commission level appeal to different courts - either to the Utah 
Supreme Court or the district court. County Brief at 11. But that is not what 
happened here, as Judge Kennedy made clear in his questioning of Assistant 
Attorney General Timothy Bodily at oral argument on the Taxpayers' Motion to 
Dismiss the County's second, statutorily precluded, appeal of the Tax 
Commission's Final Decision: 
Assistant Attorney General Timothy Bodily: 
Thank you, your honor. I do want to clarify this is not the 
first time that this issue has arised. This certainly is a little bit 
different because the way the parties have decided to approach it. 
But because of the or situation, quite often you have, well not 
quite often, but I have seen at least three circumstances, this will be 
the fourth, where one party chooses to file first in the Supreme Court 
and the other party chooses to go to the District Court and my 
understanding is that in all cases the Appellate Court defer to the 
District Court to pursue the appeal there „ . 
4812-9227-0339 4 18 
Judge Kennedy: 
Well what about the situation, where as here, the, one party 
appeals the Tax Commission decision to the Supreme Court and then 
comes back and appeals also to this Court for trial de novo, on that 
issue? Is that something you see happening? 
Timothy Bodily: 
I have not seen that issue. 
(R. at 194-195) Taxpayer Transcript at 15-16.3 
Hence, the wholly dispositive response to the County's Argument I in its 
brief - that Section 602 should be construed (essentially rewritten) to give the 
County two appeals instead of its statutorily mandated choice of one - is that the 
County was never precluded from seeking a de novo trial in the district court 
pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §59-1-601. Like all aggrieved parties from a 
decision of the Tax Commission, the County had the statutory "option" of filing its 
cross-appeal with the Utah Supreme Court (which it did), or the district court. The 
County has only itself to fault for choosing to foreclose the district court from 
conducting a trial de novo with respect to the Tax Commission's Final Decision. 
The County does not have the option to disregard and violate the plain, and 
unambiguous language of Utah Code Ann. § 59-l-602(l)(a)'s mandate that an 
3
 Mr. Bodily then claimed that the County had not filed duplicate appeals but 
merely a "protective appeal." Record at 18. The Court disagreed for the obvious 
reason that Section 602 does not authorize any so-called "protective appeals," and 
that "they [the County] have done both [two appeals] haven't they?" Id 
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aggrieved party must choose one forum (the Supreme Court) or another (the 
district court). 
Neither can the County lawfully deprive the Taxpayers of their right of 
appeal to this Court, as the County has attempted, of a purely legal issue. This 
Court's resolution of the Taxpayers' appeal and the County's cross-appeal in Case 
No. 20080304-CA. could and should moot many, if not all, issues the County's 
second and statutorily precluded second attempt to appeal the Tax Commission's 
Final Decision for a trial de novo in district court. 
Taxpayers are informed of two unpublished cases in which the issue of 
jurisdiction between the district court versus the Supreme Court has arisen under 
Section 602. The first case involved Baker v Tax Commission (20030949) and 
Regan v. Tax Commission (20030887). There, two taxpayers filed an appeal to the 
Utah Supreme Court, while a third taxpayer filed in the district court. The Tax 
Commission's Motion to Stay the district court appeal was denied. 
The second case involved Beaver County, et al v. T-Mobile (20051010-
CA). In T-Mobile apparently the counties filed first in the Utah Supreme Court 
and the taxpayer filed second in the district court. The taxpayer moved to stay the 
Supreme Court appeal, which motion was granted. 
A compelling and dispositive distinction between these non published cases 
and this case is the distinction Judge Kennedy articulated in the above-quoted 
questioning of Assistant Attorney General Timothy Bodily at oral argument on the 
Taxpayers' Motion to Dismiss the County's second appeal of the Tax Commission 
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Final Decision before the district court. No party in the cases cited above sought 
jurisdiction in a second court having first elected its remedy and invoked 
jurisdiction in this Court, as did the County in Case No. 20080304-CA, the first 
appeal, followed by Dist. Court Case No. 080907291, the second appeal. Once the 
County elected its remedy to file a Cross-Petition for Review in the Utah Supreme 
Court on April 24, 2008, the County's Second Petition for Review, filed in the 
Fourth District Court on April 25, 2008, was a nullity, and was properly dismissed 
for lack of jurisdiction. 
IL THE COUNTY DEFIED UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 59-1-601 AND 59-1-
602 NOT ONLY BY FILING A SECOND APPEAL, IN VIOLATION 
OF SECTION 602, BUT BY ATTEMPTING TO FORCE THE 
DISTRICT COURT TO CONDUCT A "TRIAL DE NOVO" USING 
THE UTAH RULES OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE, IN 
VIOLATION OF SECTION 60 L 
The County claims to have "faithfully followed the requirements of Section 
59-l-602(l)(c) and Rule 14 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure to invoke 
the jurisdiction of the district court." County Brief at 13. This argument is 
without merit and internally inconsistent because Arguments II and III in County 
Brief presume and claim entitlement to a district court trial de novo governed by 
the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. This is nonsensical. Once again, the 
County's argument defies Utah Code Ann. § 59-1-601(2), which expressly 
provides that "As used in this section, 'trial de novo' means an original, 
independent proceeding, and does not mean a trial de novo on the record." An 
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original, independent proceeding cannot be conducted pursuant to appellate rules, 
but must be conducted under the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
In further response to the County's Argument II of its brief, Taxpayers 
reiterate their prior Argument I in this brief that the County is not entitled to a 
"trial de novo" before the district court, pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 59-1-601 
(district court jurisdiction), because the County violated Utah Code Ann. § 59-1-
602(1 )(a) by ignoring the statutory mandate to exercise an wCoption" and choose 
one forum (the district court) or another (the appellate courts), not both. 
Yet, hypothetically assuming that the County is entitled to a district court 
review, the County has once again confused and distorted the statutory options. 
Utah Code Ann. § 59-l-602(l)(c) provides that "a petition for review made to the 
district court under this section shall conform to the Utah Rules of Appellate 
Procedure." (Emphasis added). The County then argues that "By properly 
following the procedures outlined in Rule 14 [of the Utah Rules of Appellate 
Procedure] to invoke the district court's jurisdiction, the county has clearly and 
unequivocally expressed its 'option' to have the district court conduct a de novo 
review." County Brief at 14. 
Therefore, in addition to the County's violation of Utah Code Ann. § 59-1-
602(1 )(a) in NOT exercising an "option" for the district court OR the appellate 
court, the County confuses and distorts the remedies available to appellants of a 
Tax Commission final decision in district court. Appellate review is available on 
the record in district court pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 59-l-602(l)(c). Such a 
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proceeding would be governed by the rules of appellate procedure. That remedy, 
however, is separate and distinct from and cannot be merged with the right for a 
trial de novo in district court under a separate statute, Utah Code Ann. § 59-1-601. 
Subsection (2) of Section 601 states that "As used in this section, 'trial de novo' 
means an original, independent proceeding, and does not mean a trial de novo on 
the record." Hence, the County's argument that its so-called right to a trial de 
novo using appellate procedures is nonsensical, even overlooking the County's 
violation of Section 602(l)(a) in filing two appeals instead of choosing the district 
court OR an appellate court. This is because all trials de novo, especially those 
statutorily defined in Section 601(2) as an "original and independent proceeding," 
cannot possibly be conducted using the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure if the 
district court is to take the statutory words "original and independent" seriously. 
A district court review of the record in a trial de novo pursuant to Section 602 
under appellate rules is inconsistent and incompatible with Section 60 Ts 
definition of a trial de novo as an "independent" and "original" proceeding. As 
Mathew Cook, co-counsel for Taxpayers, described to Judge Kennedy: 
Judge Kennedy: 
And, therefore, there's nothing to do here? 
Matthew Cook: 
Correct. If what they're seeking is an appeal. An appeal is 
governed by Section 59-1-602 which indicates that it is an option. 
You can either appeal to the Utah Court of Appeals, the Utah 
Supreme Court or the Utah District Court. If an appeal is made to 
the Utah District Court under Section 59-1-602 then the Rules of 
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Appellate Procedure and the District Court sits as an appellate court 
in those circumstances. Whereas, if you file for a trial de novo under 
a different section which is 59-1-601, the rules of civil procedure 
apply and you must file the rules of civil procedure to invoke the 
district court's jurisdiction for a new trial. So, there's essentially 
two different avenues that you can take depending on what statute 
you're attempting to invoke the district court's jurisdiction under. If 
you're attempting to invoke this court's jurisdiction for a trial de 
novo you're under 59-1-601 the rules of civil procedure apply. If 
you're trying to invoke the district court's appellate jurisdiction then 
you file under 59-1-602. 
Judge Kennedy: 
And what was done? 
Matthew Cook: 
They've essentially blended the two statutes together so in 
their petition for review they say they're filing under 59-1-601 and 
59-1-602. And now the problem is if that if you are under 59-1-601 
to invoke the court's jurisdiction you have to file a new complaint 
and the rules of civil procedure apply. Otherwise, the situation 
would be unworkable because Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure 
don't allow for entry of new evidence, new discovery and it is also 
important to note that in Wasatch County's petition for review 
they've asked for a new remedy which wasn't raised before the Tax 
Commission. It seems clear that the Utah Rules of Appellate 
Procedure don't allow for new remedies. 
(R. at 189.) Taxpayer Transcript at 10. 
In essence, the County urges this Court to read Utah Code Ann. §§ 59-1-
601 and 602 in piecemeal fashion, and then treat Utah Code Ann. §§ 59-1-601 and 
602 as a single statute. But nowhere does Utah Code Ann. §59-1-601 provide that 
the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure govern a request for a new trial made 
pursuant to Section 601. The plain language of Utah Code Ann. §59-1-601 makes 
it clear that the purpose of the statutory citation to Utah Code Ann. §63G-4-402, 
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which grants the district court jurisdiction to review by trial de novo all final 
agency action resulting from informal proceedings, is to enlarge the jurisdiction 
granted in tax cases, pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §63G-4-402, to encompass 
review by trial de novo of final agency actions resulting from formal as well as 
informal proceedings. Further, Utah Code Ann. §63G-4-402 expressly provides, 
"the petition for review of informal adjudicative proceedings shall be by complaint 
governed by the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure." Tax cases are unique in that an 
appeal from informal as well as formal adjudicative proceedings may be reviewed 
by "trial de novo" before the district court. 
In other cases, Taxpayers' counsel has participated in trials de novo before 
a district court taken on appeal from a Tax Commission final decision pursuant to 
Section 601(2). None of such trials has ever been conducted pursuant to the Utah 
Rules of Appellate Procedure, nor could they be so governed. All such de novo 
trials have been conducted pursuant to the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, which 
must govern original, independent proceedings. The County's arguments to the 
contrary, essentially that a district court can incorporate and apply appellate rules 
with trials de novo that are statutorily defined as "original" and "independent" 
proceedings in the district court, are frivolous. Such arguments do not meet the 
good faith standard under Rule 33 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. 
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IIL THE COUNTY ITSELF, AND NO ONE ELSE, HAS DEPRIVED 
THE COUNTY OF ITS RIGHT TO A DE NOVO TRIAL BEFORE 
THE DISTRICT COURT. 
The County's final arguments are to the effect that the right to a de novo 
district court review of a Tax Commission final decision is important and that the 
Utah Legislature and the people of Utah intended to preserve the viability of such 
right. County Brief at 14. Concededly, a taxpayer's or taxing authority's right to 
a trial de novo on appeal from a Tax Commission final decision is important, and, 
depending upon the unique facts and circumstances of a Tax Commission final 
decision, a taxpayer or county should be and is permitted to choose that option. 
However, the County's argument falsely presumes that the right to a trial de novo 
is somehow jeopardized when the County fails to comply with clear statutory law 
in petitioning for review of the Tax Commission's Final Decision in district court 
or in the Supreme Court, but not both. The County argues that the right to a trial 
de novo pursuant to Section 601 is an unqualified right. That is not an accurate 
assertion. A party must avail itself of its right to a trial de novo by following the 
procedures prescribed by Section 601 or else such right is forfeited. The County 
blames everyone else but itself for the forfeiture of its right to a trial de novo of 
the Tax Commission's Final Decision. The County's argument is totally without 
merit and cannot be made in good faith. 
The County's brief devotes multiple pages to extolling the virtues of 
vesting parties aggrieved by a Tax Commission decision the "option" of a trial de 
novo, which no one disputes. The County accurately points out that the enactment 
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of Utah Code Ann. § 59-1-601 (which counsel for Taxpayers originally drafted, 
submitted and supported in the Utah Legislature) was intended to overturn, and 
did, in fact, overturn, the Utah Supreme Court decision in Evans & Sutherland, 
953 P.2d 435 (Utah 1997), which held that taxpayers were not then entitled to a 
trial de novo in district court of a Tax Commission final decision resulting from 
formal adjudicative proceedings under the former Utah Constitution. Such 
arguments in the County's brief are frivolous because, once again, none of them is 
relevant to the issue at hand that this Court must decide - whether Judge 
Kennedy's Order dismissing the County's second, unauthorized and illegal appeal 
of the Tax Commission's Final Decision to this Court was lawful. No one's right 
to a trial de novo before the district court from a Tax Commission final decision is 
or has ever been in jeopardy. 
Taxpayers do not argue that a trial de novo should not be a viable option to 
any aggrieved party appearing before the Tax Commission, including the County. 
In fact, counsel for Taxpayers have exercised the statutory option for a trial de 
novo before a district court on appeal from an adverse Tax Commission decision 
on several occasions for other taxpayers, but never after having first appealed to 
the Utah Supreme Court. Had the County complied with the clear and 
unambiguous language of Utah Code Ann. § 59-1-601(1) by exercising its option 
to petition for review for a trial de novo in district court, rather than first 
exercising its statutory option by seeking a review in the Utah Supreme Court, no 
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one would have or could have disputed the County's right to a trial de novo in 
district court. 
In Case No. 2008034-CA pending before this Court, the Taxpayers 
exercised their statutory option to petition for review of the Tax Commission's 
Final Decision because they disagreed with the Tax Commission's Final Decision 
on a single legal issue - the allocation of property withdrawn from greenbelt. That 
issue is the subject of the Taxpayers' Petition for Review in Case 2008034- CA, in 
which the Taxpayers herein have filed their opening Appellants' brief. Had the 
County complied with Section 601 and petitioned for review, pursuant to the Utah 
Rules of Civil Procedure, in district court, rather than pursuant to the Utah Rules 
of Appellate Procedure in both the district court and the Supreme Court, the trial 
de novo would have proceeded without objection from the Taxpayers. Based 
upon the cases cited above in which one party appearing before the Tax 
Commission appealed to the district court and another appealed to the Utah 
Supreme Court, the appellate review of the Tax Commission Final Decision would 
likely have been stayed. But as Judge Kennedy emphasized in his comments to 
Assistant Attorney General Timothy Bodily, the County's appeal of the Tax 
Commission's Final Decision to the district court in this case, does not raise the 
situation in which one party appearing before the Tax Commission appeals to one 
forum and another party appearing before the Tax Commission appeals to another. 
Rather, in this case, the County appealed to both the district court and the 
Utah Supreme Court in total disregard of Section 602. Hence, this Court should 
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not take it upon itself to rewrite Section 602 so that the County does not suffer the 
consequences of its own failure to read and comply with Section 602 by filing two 
appeals when Section 602's ^either-or" language clearly authorizes only one 
appeal. The County's arguments that it has been deprived of a trial de novo before 
the district court by anyone other than itself are specious. 
IV. THE COUNTY'S TOUTED "EFFICIENCY" OF A TRIAL DE 
NOVO, AS COMPARED TO THIS COURT'S APPELLATE 
REVIEW OF THE TAX COMMISSION'S DECISION, IS NOT A 
PROPER ISSUE THIS COURT MUST, CAN OR SHOULD DECIDE 
The County's final argument in its brief, Argument IV, is that "allowing the 
County to enjoy its district court review is an efficient use of judicial resources." 
County Brief at 17. The County again argues the merits of having a statutory trial 
de novo option. The County then summarizes its view of the Tax Commission 
Final Decision, including the issues involved in the Tax Commission's Final 
Decision, and why, from the County's perspective, the legal issues involved in the 
case merit examination by a district court. County Brief at 21. These arguments 
are, once again, not only irrelevant to the issues before this Court, but further 
distort Section 601 and Section 602. The allocation issue, whether the Tax 
Commission's Final Decision correctly allocated value of a legally indivisible 160-
acre lot to 10 acres of that lot is already before this Court in Case No. 2008034-
CA. 
Moreover, the only issue before this Court is whether the district court 
improperly determined that it lacked jurisdiction over the County's Second 
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Petition for Review. Even if there were sound policy reasons for the district court 
to retain jurisdiction, which there are not, no authority exists for the courts to 
create jurisdiction where it is lacking. "When we lack jurisdiction, we retain only 
the authority to dismiss the action/' Varian-Eimac, Inc. v. Lamoreaux, 767 P.2d 
569, 570 (Utah Ct. App. 1989). 
Taxpayers in this case, who are Appellants in Case No. 2008034-CA, have 
already submitted their opening Brief of Appellants to this Court on the 
"allocation issue." Judge Kennedy, appropriately, neither addressed nor decided 
the "allocation issue" or any of the merits of the Tax Commission's Final Decision 
now on appeal to this Court in Case No. 2008034-CA. Instead, he correctly 
dismissed the County's Second Petition for Review on jurisdictional grounds. It is 
now improper for the County to argue the merits or issues of the Tax 
Commission's Final Decision before this Court. The only issue before this Court 
in this appeal is whether Judge Kennedy properly dismissed the County's Second 
Petition for Review, not the merits or lack thereof in the Tax Commission's Final 
Decision. 
Further, the County's argument is based on the County's unsupported 
assertion that a "trial de novo" simply allows the County to supplement the record 
created during the proceeding before the Tax Commission. Section 59-1-601 
defines a "trial de novo" as "an original, independent proceeding, and does not 
mean a trial de novo on the record." Clearly, the County's assertion that it can 
pick and choose the portions of the Tax Commission proceeding that support its 
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position and supplement the portions that are contrary to its position, is contrary to 
the very meaning of the term ^trial de novo" in the statute. 
If the Count) wishes to supplement the record it bears the burden of 
proving that the Tax Commission's Final Decision was not supported by 
substantial evidence. If the County is successful, this Court would then remand 
this case to the Tax Commission for further fact finding pursuant to Utah Code 
Ann, §63G-4-404(l)(b)(v). The County's only other option would have been to 
perfect its right to a trial de novo, which it did not do, and start anew with a new 
trial, not a review or trial on the record. In a trial de novo, which is not "a trial de 
novo on the record," the record of the Tax Commission proceeding is not relevant. 
V. THE TAXPAYERS IN THIS CASE ARE ENTITLED TO 
ATTORNEYS' FEES IN OPPOSING THE COUNTY'S APPEAL OF 
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE KENNEDY'S ORDER OF DISMISSAL 
BECAUSE THE COUNTY APPEAL IS FRIVOLOUS. 
Rule 33 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure O'Rule 33") provides: 
(a) Damages for delay or frivolous appeal. Except in a first 
appeal of right in a criminal case, if the court determines that 
a motion made or appeal taken under these rules is either 
frivolous or for delay, it shall award just damages, which may 
include single or double costs, as defined in Rule 34, and/or 
reasonable attorney fees, to the prevailing party. The court 
may order that the damages be paid by the party or by the 
party's attorney. 
(b) Definitions. For the purposes of these rules, a frivolous 
appeal, motion, brief, or other paper is one that is not 
grounded in fact, not warranted by existing law, or not 
based on a good faith argument to extend, modify, or 
reverse existing law. An appeal, motion, brief, or other paper 
interposed for the purpose of delay is one interposed for any 
improper purpose such as to harass, cause needless increase 
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in the cost of litigation, or gain time that will benefit only the 
party filing the appeal, motion, brief, or other paper. 
Utah R. App. P. 33 
When Rule 33 is determined applicable to the facts of a particular case, the 
award of damages is mandatory. See Advisory Committee Notes to Rule 33. The 
case law applying Rule 33 holds that an appeal lacking in merit violates Rule 33. 
For example, O'Brien v. Rusk 744 P.2d 306, 310 (Utah Ct.App.1987) stated, "a 
frivolous appeal is one without merit." Further, Chapman v. Uintah City, 81 P.3d 
761 (2003) held, "A claim should be deemed to be without merit when it "is 
'frivolous' or 'of little weight or importance having no basis in law or fact." In 
Porco v. Porco, 752 P.2d 365, 368-69 (Utah CtApp.1988) this Court held, "[w]e 
recognize that sanctions for frivolous appeals should only be applied in egregious 
cases, lest there be an improper chilling of the right to appeal erroneous lower 
court decisions." 
The question, therefore, is whether the County's appeal of the district court 
Order dismissing its Second Petition for Review is lacking in merit and is an 
egregious appeal for which the County should be sanctioned with an award against 
it for attorney's fees and costs. In this case, it is both. The County's second 
appeal of the Tax Commission's Final Decision to the district court is totally 
lacking merit because the County's primary argument, that its First Petition for 
Review was merely filed as a protective measure, is demonstrably false. As 
explained above, Section 602 does not authorize "protective" appeals. Neither is 
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there any language in Section 602 preserving what the County claims as its "true" 
intent - to seek a trial de novo before the district court - when the County could 
have, but did not, filed its first appeal seeking a trial de novo. 
Moreover, the first time the County asserted its "protective appeal" 
argument was after the Taxpayers sought dismissal of the County's Second 
Petition for Review. There is no evidence of the County's purported intent to file 
a "protective appeal" in the County's First Petition for Review or in the Record 
and the County has never indicated that it would dismiss its First Petition for 
Review in the event that its Second Petition for Review was permitted to proceed. 
Essentially, the County's argument attempts to retroactively assert a "protective" 
intent, which was not evident or present at the time of filling its First Petition for 
Review. 
Further, the County's "protective appeal" argument assumes that it needed 
to protect its rights in this Court. If the County had first filed a petition for review 
in the district court requesting a trial de novo, the outcome of such a trial would or 
could moot the Tax Commissions Final Decision. Any further appeals would be 
of the district court's decision following a trial de novo. The time for filing a 
notice of appeal would run from the date the district court issued its final order. 
This is because the district court decision would supersede the Tax Commission 
Final Decision. These conclusions are evident in Judge Kennedy's comments to 
Mr. Bodily: 
Well and Mr. Low says that it's been a race here for the first time, 
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maybe that's something we ought to let you do [which the Court did 
by permitting further oral argument on the jurisdictional issue]. But, 
I'm troubled by that. It seems to me that there are a number of 
things that the County could have done here. They could have filed, 
it seems to me, here first, and then filed a cross-appeal afterwards 
saying, we're just filing our cross-appeal to protect ourselves in the 
Appellate Court. We've already got a case pending in the District 
Court and we're happy to respond on the merits in the Appellate 
Court, if that's what the Appellate Court wants us to do. I would 
think they could have done that. They didn't do that. 
(R. 196-197), Taxpayer Transcript at 17-18. 
The County's brief includes arguments that stress the importance of ~de 
novo" review and that such an important right cannot be granted or denied as a 
result of a foot race to the courthouse. None of those arguments has any relevance 
or merit here because the County, and no one else, made the choice to disregard 
Section 602 and file two appeals rather than solely petitioning for a trial de novo, 
as was its right. The consequences of the County's disregard of Section 602's 
plain language should not be shifted to innocent taxpayers. Such a shift is grossly 
inequitable, and imposes unnecessary and unfair costs on the Taxpayers in 
resisting the County's frivolous arguments. That result is an egregious 
consequence to Taxpayers. 
The Taxpayers again stress that they do not deny the importance of the 
County's right to a trial de novo, but like any right, the County, like any taxpayer 
invoking a court's jurisdiction under Section 602, must properly exercise that right 
or face the consequences of its own failure to comply with statutory requirements, 
and not shift such consequences to innocent taxpayers 
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In addition, the Taxpayers are entitled to attorney's fees with respect to this 
appeal because Utah Code Ann. §59-1-601 does not permit the filing of a so-
called, County-invented, ^protective" appeal, nor do the Utah Rules of Appellate 
Procedure. The Utah Code, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure and the Utah Rules of 
Appellate Procedure prescribe the proper procedure that must be followed to 
perfect one's right to appeal. They are not written, as the County nonsensically 
argues, such that every action not expressly prohibited by the Utah Code, Utah 
Rules of Civil Procedure and the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, is authorized. 
County Brief at 14. 
Because the County has argued a position that directly contravenes the 
plain and unambiguous language of Utah Code Ann §§ 59-1-601 and 59-1-602, 
Rule 33 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure applies: "a frivolous appeal, 
motion, brief, or other paper is one that is not warranted by existing law, or not 
based on a good faith argument to extend, modify, or reverse existing law" 
justifies an award of attorneys' fees against the offending party. Clearly, a good 
faith argument for an amendment, modification, reversal or extension of Utah 
statutory law cannot be made in the courts. If the County desires an amendment to 
Section 601 or Section 602, the proper place for the County to assert such 
arguments is before the Utah Legislature. 
The procedure for requesting attorney fees under Rule 33 is 
straightforward. Rule 3 3(1) states: 
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The court may award damages upon request of any party or 
upon its own motion. A party may request damages under this 
rule only as part of the appellee's motion for summary 
disposition under Rule 10, as part of the appellee's brief, or 
as part of a party's response to a motion or other paper. 
UtahR.App. Pro 33(1) 
Therefore, Taxpayers have incorporated their request for attorney fees in 
their Appellee Brief 
CONCLUSION 
The County wrongly attempts to confuse the sole issue its appeal of the 
district court's Order of Dismissal presents with arguments that are neither 
supported by the record nor Utah law. Specifically the County argues: (1) that the 
County's First Petition for Review was not an exercise of its statutory option, and 
(2) that public policy supports the district court jurisdiction over the County's 
Second Petition for Review. The only legitimate issue before this Court is 
whether the County's exercise of its statutory option by filing its First Petition for 
Review in the Utah Supreme Court precluded district court jurisdiction over the 
County's later filed Second Petition for Review. 
This Court should affirm Judge Kennedy's dismissal of the County's 
Second Petition for Review by enforcing the plain and unambiguous language of 
Utah Code Ann. §59-l-602(l)(a), which provides each aggrieved party the option 
of selecting the venue of its choice for appealing a decision of the Utah State Tax 
Commission. 
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Further, this Court should award the Taxpayers attorney's fees and double 
costs because the County's present appeal of the district court Order of Dismissal 
is totally lacking in merit, and imposes an unfair and egregious burden on 
Taxpayers by forcing them to oppose the County's frivolous arguments, which 
urge this Court to amend Utah statutory law. 
DATED this 10th day of December, 2008 
RANDY M. GRIMSHAW 
MAXWELL A. MILLER 
MATTHEW D. COOK 
PARSONS BEHLE & LATIMER 
Attorneys for Taxpayers 
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ADDENDUM 
Addendum 1: Determinative Statutes 
63G-4-402. Judicial review — Informal adjudicative proceedings. 
(1) (a) The district courts have jurisdiction to review by trial de 
novo all final agency actions resulting from informal 
adjudicative proceedings, except that the juvenile courts have 
jurisdiction over all state agency actions relating to: 
(i) the removal or placement of children in state 
custody; 
(ii) the support of children under Subsection (l)(a)(i) 
as determined administratively under Section 78A-6-1106; 
and 
(iii) substantiated findings of abuse or neglect made by 
the Division of Child and Family Services, after an 
evidentiary hearing. 
(b) Venue for judicial review of informal adjudicative 
proceedings shall be as provided in the statute governing the 
agency or, in the absence of such a venue provision, in the 
county where the petitioner resides or maintains the 
petitioner's principal place of business. 
(2) (a) The petition for judicial review of informal adjudicative 
proceedings shall be a complaint governed by the Utah Rules 
of Civil Procedure and shall include: 
(i) the name and mailing address of the party seeking 
judicial review; 
(ii) the name and mailing address of the respondent 
agency; 
(iii) the title and date of the final agency action to be 
reviewed, together with a copy, summary, or brief description 
of the agency action; 
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(iv) identification of the persons who were parties in 
the informal adjudicative proceedings that led to the agency 
action; 
(v) a copy of the written agency order from the 
informal proceeding; 
(vi) facts demonstrating that the party seeking judicial 
review is entitled to obtain judicial review; 
(vii) a request for relief, specifying the type and extent 
of relief requested; and 
(viii) a statement of the reasons why the petitioner is 
entitled to relief. 
(b) All additional pleadings and proceedings in the district 
court are governed by the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
(3) (a) The district court, without a jury, shall determine all 
questions of fact and law and any constitutional issue 
presented in the pleadings. 
(b) The Utah Rules of Evidence apply injudicial proceedings 
under this section. 
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63G-4-404. Judicial review — Type of relief. 
(1) (a) In either the review of informal adjudicative proceedings 
by the district court or the review of formal adjudicative 
proceedings by an appellate court, the court may award 
damages or compensation only to the extent expressly 
authorized by statute. 
(b) In granting relief, the court may: 
(i) order agency action required by law; 
(ii) order the agency to exercise its discretion as 
required by law; 
(iii) set aside or modify agency action; 
(iv) enjoin or stay the effective date of agency action; 
(v) remand the matter to the agency for further 
proceedings. 
(2) Decisions on petitions for judicial review of final agency 
action are reviewable by a higher court, if authorized by 
statute. 
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Addendum 2 The District Court's Order of Dismissal 
Addendum 3 Utah State Tax Commission Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, 
and Final Decision dated April L 2008. 
Addendum 4 Taxpayer Transcript of District Court Proceedings (Prepared by 
Counsel for Taxpayer) 
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ADDENDUM 2 
District Court's Order of Dismissal 
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BEFORE THE UTAH STATE TAX COMMISSION 
WARREN AND TRICIA OSBORN, MICHAEL F 
SULLIVAN, DAVID AND CYNTHIA MIRSKY, 
NORMAN PROVAN, JEFFREY AND NANCY 
TRUMPER, GARY AND CATHERINE 
CRITTENDEN, DAVID CHECKETTS AND 
MOUNT CLYDE ENTERPRISES L.C., 
Petitioner, 
vs. 
BOARD OF EQUALIZATION OF WASATCH 
COUNTY, UTAH, 
Respondent. 
FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS OF 
LAW, AND FINAL DECISION 
Appeal Nos. 06-1504, 06-1505, 06-1506, 06-
1507,06-1508,06-1509,06-1510 
Tax Type: Property Tax/Locally Assessed 
Tax Year: 2006 & Roll Back Period 2001-05 
Judge: Phan 
This Order may contain confidential "commercial information" within the meaning of Utah Code Sec. 59-1-404, 
and is subject to disclosure restrictions as set out in that section and Utah Admin. Rule R861-1A-37. The rule 
prohibits the parties from disclosing commercial information obtained from the opposing party to nonparties, 
outside of the hearing process. However, pursuant to Utah Admin. Rule R861-1A-37 the Tax Commission may 
publish this decision, in its entirety, unless the property taxpayer responds in writing to the Commission, within 
30 days of this order, specifying the commercial information that the taxpayer wants protected. 
Presiding: 
Pam Hendrickson, Commission Chair 
Marc Johnson, Commissioner 
Jane Phan, Administrative Law Judge 
Appearances: 
For Petitioner: Max Miller, Attorney at Law 
Randy Grimshaw, Attorney at Law 
Norman Provan, Owner 
Douglas Anderson, Developer 
For Respondent: Thomas Low, Wasatch County Attorney 
Gien Burgener, Wasatch County Assessor 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This matter came before the Utah State Tax Commission for a Formal Hearing on December 
18-19, 2007. Based upon the evidence and testimony presented at the hearing, the Tax Commission hereby 
makes its: 
Appeal Nos. 06-1 504. 06-1 505, 06-1 506 06-1507, 06-1 508, 06-1 509 & 06-1510 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. Petitioners are appealing the assessed values as set by the Wasatch Count)' Boaid of 
Equalization for the land on the subject lots, for the 2006 tax year. In addition to the 2006 assessed value, 
Petitioners Sullivan, Mirsky, Crittenden, Provan and Trumper are appealing the rollback tax assessment against 
each of their properties subject to this appeal. 
2. As of the lien date at issue the properties had residences or buildings eithei constructed or in 
partial states of construction. The value of the buildings was not at issue in this appeal. 
3. The subject properties are all located in the Wolf Creek Subdivision in Wasatch County. The 
owner, parcel number, size and valuations as assessed by Respondent, which are the subject of this appeal, are 
as follows: 
Petitioners Lot/Parcel No. Acres County's Rollback County Board's 2006 
Values Appealed Values Appealed 
No Rollback Land-GreenBelt $ 201,800 
Appeal Land-Homes ite $ 550,000 
Warren & Tricia Osborn 61 /OWR-4B61 160 
Michael Sullivan 46/OWR-3A46 184 
David & Cynthia Mirsky 53/OWR-4A53 160 
Gary & Catherine 75/OWR-5B75 160 
Crittenden 
Norman Provan 25/OWR-2A25 160 
Jeffrey & Nancy Trumper 50/OWR-3A50 160 
2001-2005 Land-Greenbelt $1,040,288 
$360,000 per year Land-Homesite $ 360,000 
2002-2006 Land-Greenbelt $1,150,000 
$698,200 per year 
2001-2005 Land-Greenbelt $ 562,100 
$360,000 per year Land-Homesite $1,080,000 
2001-2005 Land-Greenbelt $ 476,800 
$773,200 per year Land-Homesite $ 773,200 
2001-2005 Land-Greenbelt $1,040,000 
$360,000 per year Land-Homesite $ 360,000 
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David Checketts & Mount 12/OWR-2012 160 No Rollback Land-Gieenbelt $ 201,800 
Clyde Enterprises LC Appeal Land-Homesite $ 845,000 
4. The Wolf Creek Ranch subdivision ("Ranch") is an exclusive, appioved and platted 
subdivision. It covers approximately 14,000 acres and has 84 single-family home site parcels. With the 
exception of a few parcels, all home site parcels in the subdivision are at least 160 acres. All parcels subject to 
this appeal are 160 acres or larger. Access to the subdivision is from a main gate at 3480 Bench Creek Road in 
Woodland and a secondary gate located off of Lake Creek Road in Heber City. Access to the subject lots is 
provided year round by paved interior roadways, which are maintained by the subdivision. 
5. The land uses surrounding the Ranch are primarily recreational and agricultural in nature. The 
Ranch shares approximately seven miles of common boarder with the Uinta National Forest on the east, which 
is accessible from the Ranch. Jordanelle Reservoir is ten miles west and Rockport State Park and Reservoir 20 
miles north. Park City with its ski and summer resorts is located approximately 22 miles northwest. 
6. The subdivision amenities at the Ranch include a 26-acre common area with an equestrian 
center and stables, a 2,800 square foot guesthouse and two large trout stocked ponds. There is another 23-acre 
common area with tepees, fire pits, campground areas, corrals and approximately one-mile of frontage along 
the Upper Provo River. Tliere are several yurts at the property that can be accessed by the residents. There is 
approximately fifty miles of equestrian trails through the ranch and the entire property is protected by private 
security. 
7. Although each subject parcel is 160 acres or larger, it can be developed as only one, single-
family home site. 
8. The limitations on development aie both from zoning and a conservation easement. The 
property is zoned P-160 under the jurisdiction of Wasatch County. P-160 is a pieseivation zoning where 
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development may be limited do to remoteness of services, topography and other sensitive environmental issues 
Residential development is allowed in the zoning with basically one residence pei 160 acics Conditional uses 
include groupings of residential lots provided that density is not increased, water storage, fishirg activities and 
sand and giavel quairying-
9. The principal developei of the Ranch, Douglas Anderson, testified that the area had been 
ranched foi over one hundred years and it was the intent in developing the Ranch to preserve large amounts of 
open space and continue the ranching tradition. As theie was the possibly that zoning could be changed and 
higher density7 allowed at some point in the future by the Count}' or other governmental jurisdiction, to insure 
the restrictions remained permanently, they placed conservation easements on the property as it was 
subdivided. The conservation easements were granted to the Utah Open Lands Conservation Association, Inc. 
As such the subject lots are permanently encumbered by the conservation easements. The conservation 
easements allow for one-home site with the improvements specifically limited to the 10-acre building envelope. 
Within the 10-acre building envelope the property owner may construct both a primary single-family residence 
and a caretaker residence. A garage and other barns and outbuildings may be constructed. All the buildings 
must be located within the ten-acre envelope as well as any loadways, utility lines; water wells water storage 
tanks, waterlines and septic tanks. The 10-acre building area may not be located in wildlife birthing areas, 
goshawk nesting habitats or riparian areas. The conservation easement would permanently prohibit buildings 
or other improvements on the acres outside of the 10-acre building envelope. Further, there could be no 
quarrying or mining on the property. 
10. Subject to some restrictions, that included specified habits and riparian areas or the County 
building requirements regarding slope and setbacks, the purchaser chooses which ten contiguous acres to use 
for the building envelope, and then chooses the home site within those acres. Norman Provan, an owner of one 
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of the subject lots, and Mr Anderson both testified that not only could the homeowners choose the site of the 
building envelope it was possible to move the building envelope at least until construction commenced, and 
even then there was some possibility of adjustment as long as it encompassed the buildings. Mr. Andersen 
testified that typically the location of the building envelope was limited only by County building restrictions. 
During the period now subject to the rollback, the 10-acre building envelopes had not yet been designated. 
Based on these factors the Commission finds that during the rollback period there was no specific one-acre of 
the property designated as the home site or ten acres designated as the building envelope. 
11. Mr. Provan, an owner of one of the subject lots testified that he purchased the lot because of 
size and restrictions on development He indicated he chose the property over other subdivisions because he 
liked that all 14,000 acres would be preserved with the same restrictions and remain as a wilderness setting. 
He also felt he was doing something good by preserving open space. Another owner, Mike Sullivan testified 
that they purchased the property because they wanted the large acreage and a place to ride their horses. It was 
his understanding that the restrictions on the property made it so that each lot could not be subdivided. 
12. As the property had been ranched for many years it had been assessed under the Farmland 
Assessment Act ("FAA") for property tax purposes, based on its agricultural use, rather than its market value. 
Agricultural use continues over most of the Ranch property as of the date of the hearing as the Homeowners 
Association leases the Ranch property out to a sheep operation. A property owner may fence their 10-acre 
building envelope to keep the sheep out of that portion of the property, but must allow sheep to graze on the 
remaining acreage. As of the lien date, none of the Petitioners had chosen to fence their 10-acre building 
envelopes and have allowed the sheep to graze throughout their properties. The County had assessed these 
properties with the entire parcel valued as greenbelt property under the FAA even after the subdivision was 
platted, up until the time a building permit was issued. Once a building permit was taken out on a particular 
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paicel the Count)' lemovcd the one-acie home site from valuation under the FAA and that one acie became 
subject to the ioil back tax Howevei the Count) considered the othei 1 ~)9 acies oi moic on each paicel to 
lemain as greenbelt and the County continues to assess the remaining acies undei the f A A 
13 The FAA requiies disparate tieatment regarding the home site and lemaming acies that aie 
ranched or farmed Pursuant to the FAA, the farmhouse and land used in connection w ilh the fai mhouse is not 
taxed under the act, but is instead assessed based on fair market value For greenbelt properties located outside 
of cit) limits, Wasatch County applies a standard of one as the land used in connection with the fai mhouse oi 
home site 
14 As there had been sales of lots in the Ranch, there was market information to determine a fair 
market value for each paicel at issue The reason the matter came befoie the Commission foi the Formal 
Hearing was that the parties were m disagreement on how much of the total value of the 160 acre parcels 
should be attributed to the one-acre home sites A detennmation of the value for the one-acre is lelevant for 
the puiposes of determining the amount of the rollback, as well as for the assessment for the 2006-year 
15 When the County issued the Tax Notices for the years that are now subject to the rollback, the 
notices did not list out or allocate a portion of the total market value to either the home site acre or the building 
envelope Instead, the notices listed a single, total market value for the entire parcels Because the property 
was taxed as greenbelt under the FAA, the amount of the tax assessed, however, was not based on the market 
value, but instead on the greenbelt value pursuant to the FAA 
16 Petitioners submitted an appraisal for each of the properties at issue, which had been prepared 
by Philip Cook, MAI, and CRE Mr Cook's appraisal was limited to a market valuation of the land only It 
was Mr Cook's appraisal conclusion that there was some variation in values between the lots, due to factors 
like view, slope and forestation It was his appraisal conclusion that the total mai ket value of the land for each 
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of the parcels at issue, as of January L 2006, was as follows: 
Lot 12 $1,350,000 
Lot 25 $1,340,000 
Lot 46 $1,410,000 
Lot 50 $1,715,000 
Lot 53 $1,285,000 
Lot 61 $1,715,000 
Lot 75 $1,850,000 
17. Mr. Cook's market values for each subject parcel were not substantially disputed by 
Respondent. Mr. Cook's market value conclusions for the land were based on eleven lot sales, all located 
within the Ranch. The sales had occurred from October 2004 through May 2006 The lots had sold for prices 
ranging from $1,225,000 to $1,800,000. 
18 In his appraisal Mr. Cook also gave his opinion of how the total value should be allocated to 
the various components of the lot, including the one-acre home site. It was his position that allocations to the 
functional areas of each lot must reflect the market value and he indicated there were circumstances when a 
separate value for a home site consisting as part of a larger parcel could be determined. However, it was his 
conclusion that in this matter, any allocation of the total purchase price of the lot to the home site was simply 
not market supported. He reached this conclusion because the 160 acres could not be subdivided and with the 
restrictions from zoning and conservation easements the highest and best use of the subject lots were as large 
160-acre single family lots. He pointed to the Uniform Standards of Professional Appraisal Practice and 
indicates that they specifically warn against allocating value without market support.1 It was his opinion that 
the County had apportioned the values to the various components of the lots arbitrarily. It was Mi. Cook's 
conclusion that if it is necessary to allocate or apportion part of the total lot value to the home site acre, it could 
only be done pro rata, 1/160th of the total value, as it is the entire lot and the similarity to all othei lots within 
1 Mr Cook cites to Uniform Standards of Professional Appraisal Practice and Advisor)' Opinions. 2006 Edition. Appraisal 
- 7 -
Appeal Nos 06-1504, 06-1505, 06-1506, 06-1507, 06-1508, 06-1509 &i 06-1510 
the development that create the value. 
19. David A. Thomas, Professor of Law, testified thai the zoning and conservation easement had 
to be taken into account in determining the value It was his opinion that it was not legal to buy or sell any 
portion of the lot smallei than the total 160 acres. Tins was a point that was supported by all evidence and not 
disputed. It was Professor Thomas' conclusion that because one acre could not be sold separately, there was 
no fair market value for the one-acre home site, only a value foi the property as a whole. Professor Thomas 
also pointed out that additional value will be taxed in the improvements. 
20. Robert Crawford, PhD, testified that the conservation easement actually enhanced the value of 
the property. He also testified that the highest and best use of the property was not for agriculture, it was 
instead as a 160-acre residential building lot. As part of the whole he concluded that each acre of the 160-acre 
property had the same value as all the other acres. He stated that a fair market value for the one- acre home site 
could be determined but only on the basis of 1/160 of the total value as indicated by Mr. Cook. It was Dr. 
Crawford's conclusion that recognizing an allocated valuation method to all the acres is economically valid as 
it the way of expressing the enhanced value of the whole. The right to build a residence somewhere on the 
property presumably increase the value of the 160 acre lot. That will be reflected in the price per acre. He did 
not find an extracted market value using lots similar in size that have sold to be a valid valuation technique. 
21 . Glen Burgener, the Wasatch County Assessor, testified that under the FAA, the County is 
required to allocate a portion of the total value to the home site acre, which is subject to tax on a fair market 
value basis, while the remainder of the property was taxable under greenbelt. He testified that he had been 
applying the FAA to properties for seventeen years in Wastatch County. The County had farms with home 
sites on numerous properties of varying zones where the County is required to allocate a portion of the total 
Standards Board, The Appraisal Foundation, Standards Rule l-4(e) Comment. 
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value to the home site. In addition to farms in the P-l 60 zone, there were farms with home sites on properties 
in the following zones: A-20 allowing only 1 residence per 20 acres ; R-A-5 allowing only one residence per 5 
acres; R-A-l allowing only one residence per 1 -acre. To establish a value for the home site, the County would 
consider values of buildable lots in the area. It was the County's position that the right to build a residence is 
part of the home site value. 
22. In 1999, when the subject lots were platted and because of the conservation easement, Mr. 
Burgener sought advise from representatives of the State Tax Commission's Property' Tax Division on how to 
allocate the total values of the property. At this time, the County made the determination that the total value, 
which was based on the sales, would be allocated 60% to the primary residential buildable site, 22% to the 
secondary or caretaker's buildable site, $25,000 per acre to the rest of the acres in the building envelope and 
whatever was left of the market value to the remaining acres. It was the County's position that a substantial 
portion of the value of the remaining 150-acres shifted to the 10 acres building envelope due to the 
conservation easement However, this valuation break out was not conveyed to the property owners on the 
annual Tax Notices issued for the years that are now subject to the rollback. 
23. Blaine D. Hales, Certified General Appraiser, prepared an appraisal for the Respondent for 
purposes of estimating the value of the one-acre home site on the property. The appraisal was prepared for one 
lot, Lot 75, which was the Crittenden property. It was the County's intent that the same methodology for 
determining the value for the home site be applied to the other properties. It was Mr. Hales conclusion that the 
total value of Lot 75 was $1,800,000, of which $1,200,000 was for the one-acre home site and $600,000 for 
the reaming 159 acres. 
24. In his appraisal, Mr. Hales determined the value of the one-acre site by estimating the overall 
value of the entire parcel and using additional data to allocate or estimate the value contributed by the one-acre 
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home site to the oveiall parcel It was his conclusion that he could determine a fair allocation of the maiket 
value, despite that the one acic could not be legally sold separately 
25. Like Mi Cook, Mi Hales' estimate of the total market value came Horn sales within the 
Ranch, all located veiy neai Lot 75 He also considered the purchase price of Lot 75, which was $ 1 ,800,000 
on October 29, 2004 It was his conclusion that the fair market value of the land only on Lot 75, as of the 
January 1, 2006 lien date, was $1,800,000. As a comparison, Mr. Cook had valued this lot at $ 1,850,000. 
26. To determine a value for the one acre home site, it was Mr. Hales position that the building 
site, when reduced to one acre, must also include the legal right to construct a home because the appraisei must 
be careful to divide both the physical and legal components of the property. He attributed the right to build to 
the one acre while the remaining 1 59 acres he considered to have only the limited agricultural and recreational 
uses. 
27. To estimate the allocation to the one acre, Mr. Hales relied on two methods: I) determining the 
value of the unbuildable portion of the property; and 2) determining the value of the right to build by 
considering sales of conservation easements. To determine the value of the unbuildable land, Mr Hales found 
six comparables of rangeland with recreational desirability, but without the right for potential residential 
development. He concluded that these sales indicated a value for the unbuildable portion of the propeity to be 
$500,000. In this analysis, Mr. Hales indicated that he considered 159 acres as unbuildable and only the one-
acre, used by the County as the home site, as buildable. From the analysis of conservation easements he relied 
on six sales and concluded that the right to build on the subject along with the one-acre home site would 
represent approximately 65% of the subject's value while the remainder should be allocated to the unbuildable 
agricultural and recreational land. In his reconciliation of the two approaches he concluded that 65% of the 
total value should be allocated to the buildable home site and the remainder to the agricultural land. 
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28. Upon review of all the evidence in this matter, the Commission concludes that prior to 
designation of the 10-acre building envelope, as evidenced by the issuance of a building permit, there would be 
no distinction in value from one acre to the next for the 160 acre parcels, as the right to build was attached to 
the value of the entire lot as a whole and each acre up to the 160 acres contributed equally to the value. 
29. However, once the 10-acre building envelope has been designated, the value is no longer 
equally contributed on a per acre basis. All development and improvement must be limited to the ten acres. 
The right to build attaches to the building envelope. Furthermore, the restrictions of the conservation easement 
are then attached to the now identifiable 150 acres. The owner may no longer build fences, roadways, corrals, 
swimming pools, manmade ponds or gardens on the 150 acres. Once the building envelope has been 
established there is a clearly identifiable difference between the 10-acre building envelope and the remainder of 
the property, a difference that does impact how these two portions of property contribute to the value. 
30. Regardless of the fact that a one-acre home site may not legally be sold separately from the 
159 acres of the lot, the County must allocate a fair market value to the one-acre based on the express language 
of the FAA. Mr. Hales was the only party who attempted to do this in a manner that reflects the reality that the 
building site is worth more than the undevelopable property subject to the conservation easement. Absent 
evidence from Petitioner's experts that addressed the disparity in value, the Commission accepts Mr. Hales 
conclusion that 65% of the value of the total lot is attributable to the developable portion of the land. 
However, the Commission finds that the building site is not one-acre, it is ten-acres. From a review of Mr. 
Hales' appraisal, his testimony at the hearing regarding the 10-acre building site and that of the other witnesses 
describing the potential for the 10-acre envelope, the Commission concludes that the 65% for the buildable 
portion applies to the 10 buildable acres and is not appropriately limited to a one-acre home site. Nine of the 
ten buildable acres as of the lien date were still being used for agricultural purposes and one acre must be 
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valued as the home site according to statute. As far as allocating a portion of the 65% to the one-acre, the 
Commission is unable to further determine which portion of the value is attributable to each acre, othei than 
using 1/10 of the 65% of the total market value. 
31 . Mr. Cook has appraised each individual lot at issue in this appeal to determine a total value as 
of the January 1, 2006 lien date. The County's assessments for 2006 were not always consistent with Mr. 
Cook's conclusions. The County did not substantially refute Mr. Cook's total values for each lot, and the 
County did not submit an appraisal of each lot. For tax year 2006, the Commission accepts Mr. Cook's total 
lot value for the land portion of each of the subject properties. The Commission finds the value of the 10- acre 
building envelope to be 65% of the total lot value, and the one-acre home site value to be 1/10 of the 65% 
attributed to the building envelope. 
APPLICABLE LAW 
1. All tangible taxable property shall be assessed and taxed at a uniform and equal rate on the 
basis of its fair market value, as valued on January 1, unless otherwise provide by law. (2) Beginning January 
1, 1995, the fair market value of residential property/ shall be reduced by 45%, representing a residential 
exemption allowed under Utah Constitution Article XIII, Section 2, Utah Constitution. (Utah Code Sec. 59-2-
103.) 
2. "Fair market value" means the amount at which property would change hands between a 
willing buyer and a willing seller, neither being under any compulsion to buy or sell and both having 
reasonable knowledge of the relevant facts. For purposes of taxation, "fair market value" shall be determined 
using the current zoning laws applicable to the property in question, except in cases where there is a reasonable 
probability of a change in the zoning laws affecting that property in the tax year in question and the change 
would have an appreciable influence upon the value. (Utah Code Sec. 59-2-102(12).) 
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3. For general property tax purposes, land may be assessed on the basis of the value that the land 
has for agricultural use if the land: (a) is not less than five contiguous acres in area. . . and (b) except as 
provided in Subsection )5): (i) is actively devoted to agricultural use; and (ii) has been actively devoted to 
agricultural use for at least two successive years immediately preceding the tax year for which the land is being 
assessed under this part. (Utah Code Sec. 59-2-503(1).) 
4. All structures which are located on land in agricultural use, the farmhouse and the land on 
which the farmhouse is located, and land used in connection with the farmhouse, shall be valued, assessed, and 
taxed using the same standards, methods, and procedures that apply to other taxable structures and other land 
in the county. (Utah Code Sec. 59-2-507(2).) 
5. (2) In addition to the value determined in accordance with Subsection (1), the fair market 
value assessment shall be included on the notices described in (a) Subsection 59-2-919(4); and (b) Section 59-
2-1317. (3)The county board of equalization shall review the agricultural use value and fair market value 
assessments each year as provided under Section 59-2-1001. (Utah Code Sec. 59-2-505 (2)&(3).) 
6. Except as provided in this section, Section 59-2-506.5 or Section 59-2-511, if land is 
withdrawn from this part, the land is subject to a roll back tax imposed in accordance with this section. (Utah 
Code Sec. 59-2-506(1).) 
7. The county assessor shall determine the amount of the rollback tax by computing the 
difference for the rollback period described in Subsection (3)(b) between: (i) the tax paid wile the land was 
assessed under this part; and (ii) the tax that would have been paid had the property not been assessed under 
this part. (Utah Code Sec. 59-2-506(3).) 
8. Any person dissatisfied with the decision of the county board of equalization concerning the 
assessment and equalization of any property, or the determination of any exemption in which the person has an 
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interest, may appeal that decision to the commission by filing a notice of appeal specifying the grounds for the 
appeal with the county auditoi within 30 days aftei the final action of the county board. (Utah Code Sec 59-2-
1006(1).) 
9. (2) In assessing the fair market value of a parcel of property that is subject to a minimum 
parcel size of one acre or more, a county assessor shall include as part of the assessment: (a) that the parcel of 
property may not be subdivided into parcels of property smaller than the minimum parcel size; and (b) any 
effects Subsection (2)(a) may have on the fair market value of the parcel of property. (3) This section does not 
prohibit a county assessor from including as part of an assessment of the fair market value of a parcel of 
property any other factor affecting the fair market value of the parcel of property. (Utah Code Sec. 59-2-
301.2(2) & (3).) 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. Petitioner has raised two separate but related issues. The first is whether the value of a home 
site contained within a larger and unsubdividable property may be retroactively established at the time of 
assessment of a rollback tax. The second is the fair market value of the existing home site for purposes of 
determining the current year's property tax assessment. To begin, a determination of the rollback tax presents 
issues of both fact and law to the Commission. Pursuant to Utah Code Sec, 59-2-506 the amount of the 
rollback tax is computed by taking the difference between the tax paid during the roll back period based on its 
agricultural use under the FAA and the tax that would have been paid annually based on an a fair market value 
assessment. For each year of the rollback period, the County on an annual basis had already determined the 
fair market value for the subject property. Furthermore, the County was required to list the fair market value 
on the Tax Valuation Notices as they were issued each year. If Petitioners were in disagreement with the 
market value set by the County, Petitioners' recourse was to appeal the market value each year as provided in 
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Sec 59-2-1001 Therefore, the total fair market value for each property at issue for the rollback yeais was 
already established by the County pursuant to the annual notices they issued that were not appealed and may 
not now be challenged by either party based on the circumstances in this matter 
2. Respondent's witnesses acknowledged, and it was supported by the exhibits and testimony of 
Petitioners' witnesses, that when the County listed the fair market value on the annual notices mailed out for 
the years subject to the rollback, it listed only a total value for the entire 160-acre parcel without any breakout 
for home site land. Petitioners did not file annual appeals regarding the total market value indicated on the 
notices for each of the rollback years. Petitioners were not given the opportunity to challenge the County's 
allocation of the total market value to the home site acre, because they were never given notice of what that 
amount was. Had Petitioners been notified of the allocation to the home site acre, and that it was an amount 
different from a 1/160 allocation of the total value, Petitioners may have appealed the value on annual basis as 
is provided in the statute at Utah Code Section 59-2-505 and 59-2-1001. 
3. Furthermore, the Commission notes that for rollback purposes, valuation is based on the 
property, as it existed during the rollback period. Valuation is not based on the condition of the property that 
results after a portion has been withdrawn from greenbelt The Commission finds that if the County valued the 
home site at a higher rate during the rollback years, the County should have indicated so annually on its 
valuation notices as they were issued for each of those years, so that the home site value could have been 
appealed annually pursuant to Utah Code Section 59-2-505 and 59-2-1001. Failure to do so alone is sufficient 
for the Commission to find that rollback tax is limited to 1/160th2 of the total value listed by the County each 
year in its valuation notices issued to Petitioners. Additionally, this legal basis is supported by the 
Commission's factual conclusion that during the rollback period, there were no designated building envelopes 
2 For Lot 46 which was 184 acres the rollback tax must be based on 1/184lh of the total value 
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or home sites and, therefoie, each one of the 160 acres was as valuable as the rest. Prior to the issuance of the 
building permit there would have been no basis foi the County to determine the one-acre home site upon which 
the residence would be located. 
4 With fespect to the second issue, the question of the current home site value, it is the 
Commission's conclusion that the issue of determining the market value of the one-acre home site for the 2006 
lien date presents both legal and factual issues. Petitioners" witness, Dr Thomas, argued that a market value 
could not be determined for the one acre as it could not be legally separated. Petitioners also argue that Utah 
Code Sec. 59-2-301.2 regarding minimum parcel size supports their contention. Although the one-acre home 
site may not legally be sold separately, Utah Code Sec. 59-2-507 requires that the County assess it at fair 
market value and is the specific and controlling statute on the taxation of a home site used in connection with 
greenbelt property. Subsection 507(2) provides that the farmhouse and land used in connection with the 
farmhouse shall be valued, assessed, and taxed using the same standards, methods and procedures that apply to 
other taxable land and structures in the County. However, the subsection does not provide specific guidance 
on how to make that determination when the home site is part of an unsubdividable lot. Utah Code Sec. 59-2-
301.2 does prohibit the County from valuing the 160-acre subject parcels as if they were subdividable into 
numerous single-family residential lots. The County has not valued this property as if higher density was 
allowed. Furthermore, subsection 59-2-301.2 (3) expressly provides that the County Assessor may include as 
part of the assessment other factors affecting the fair market value of the parcel of property. Finally, the fact 
that Mr. Cook's valuations differ based on specific property characteristics, in addition to size, implicitly 
demonstrates that the value of any given unit of land may vary from another within each lot. 
5. The Commission finds that each acre of the 160- acre parcel contributes to value. Prior to the 
designation of the building envelope this was on an equal basis. However, once the buildable envelope was 
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designated, as had occurred foi all pi operties subject to this appeal by the 2006 lien date, there are two distinct 
and identifiable classes of property, the 10 acre building envelope and the remaining undevelopable aiea 
covered by the conservation easement. These two areas do not contribute equally to the value. Respondent has 
offered an appraisal that makes a distinction. Although the Commission disagrees with the limitation of the 
analysis to the one acre, because the entire 10 acres is developable with the possibility of a second home, 
garages, barns, outbuildings, yard features and so forth, which all contribute to the value of the building site, 
the Commission finds that in the absence of testimony and evidence to the contrary, Mr. Hales' analysis 
adequately supports that 65% of the value is attributable to the buildable envelope for these properties. 
6. As of the lien date, only one acre of the ten-acre buildable envelope had been withdrawn from 
greenbelt for each of these properties. As additional improvements are made in the buildable envelope, 
additional acreage may be withdrawn and rollback assessed. 
DECISION AND ORDER 
Based upon the foregoing, the Tax Commission finds that the County is to calculate the 
rollback taxes for each of the properties for each rollback year based on the market value for the home site acre 
being l/160tb or 1/184th' depending on the size of the lot, of the total value indicated for that year on the tax 
notices issued by the County. The County is to calculate the fair market value of the home site acre for the 
2006 tax year for each parcel at issue on the basis of 65%> of the total value of the lot as determined in the Cook 
appraisal divided by 10. It is so ordered. The County Auditor is ordered to adjust the assessment records as 
appropriate in compliance with this order. 
DATED this / day of Cjj/UL<L^ 2008. 
G^ljAA^DWu 
Janb Phan * 
Administrative Law Judge 
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BY ORDER OF THE UTAH STATE TAX COMMISSION 
The Commission has reviewed this case and the undeisigned concut in this decision 
DATED this / day of ^ - 4 ^ ^ ^ ^ 2008 
(X\Y\ 
Pam Hendnckson 
Commission Chai 
Marc B. Johns 
Commissioner 
EXCUSED 
R. Bruce Johnson 
Commissioner ft \ **— • j ^uumiibb uiici
D'Arcy Dixon Pi 
Commissioner 
0Y\. 
Notice of Appeal Rights: You have twenty (20) days after the date of this order to file a Request for 
Reconsideration with the Tax Commission Appeals Unit pursuant to Utah Code Ann. Sec. 63-46b-13. A 
Request for Reconsideration must allege newly discovered evidence or a mistake of law or fact. If you do not 
file a Request for Reconsideration with the Commission, this order constitutes final agency action You have 
thirty (30) days after the date of this order to pursue judicial review of this order in accordance with Utah Code 
Sec. 59-1-601 et seq. and 63-46b-13 et seq. 
JKP06-1504fofdoc 
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WASATCH COUNTY V. UTAH STATE TAX COMMISSION 080907392 
TRANSCRIPT of Hearing before Judge John Paul Kennedy, July 14, 2008 
Judge 
Judge 
I Judge 
Thomas 
Lowe 
1 Tim Bodily 
Matt Cook 
1 Max Miller 
Judge 
I Mr. Bodily 
Judge 
1 Mr. Bodily 
Judge 
Bodily 
Judge 
Lowe 
| Wasatch County v. Utah Tax Commission 
(various background noises) 
All set. 
Yeah. 
Okay, let's have your appearances, please. j 
I guess Fll start. Good morning, Your Honor. Thomas Lowe for Wasatch 
County. 
Tim Bodily. I'm appearing on behalf of the Tax Commission. 
Matt Cook on behalf of Warren and Tricia Osborne. 
Maxwell Miller on behalf of Warren and Tricia Osborne. I 
Okay. Mr. Bodily, has anyone ever asked you if you're a character from a I 
Shakespeare play, or something. 
No. 
Not yet, huh? 
Not yet. 1 
Okay, well. Put that down as a question that you've been asked. 
Okay, Fll do it. 
Okay, Mr. Lowe, your office sent a courtesy copy of an appeals order staying the 
appeal pending. Tell me what happened and how we got to the appellate court 
and what they did and. . . 
Fd be happy to, thank you, your honor. Back in April, I think it was April. . . I I 
don't have the dates exactly right now. April 1st, I think, or so. Maybe it was the 
10th. The Tax Commission issued its decision in this case. The property owners 
represented by Mr. Miller, Mr. Grimshaw and Mr. Cook appealed to the 
Supreme Court and eventually the County cross appealed also. The Supreme 
Court then poured over that appeal to the court of appeals and the court of 
appeals has it now. The County filed a Motion for Stay. The Tax Commission 
joined in that motion and it was opposed by the petitioner, or, sorry, by the j 
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landowners. Subsequent to my brief, and the reason we provided that copy to 
the court was subsequent to our briefing the court of appeals did grant that stay. 
You have that order now. So the same exact appeal, essentially, is in two places. 
The Tax Commission's decision, which is being appealed by the property 
owners in the appellate courts is sitting there and is sitting there waiting for your 
initial review to conclude. And then this appeal in this court is now the primary 
action proceeding forth. So, that's a brief rundown of how we got where we are. 
i Was it appealed by the property owners to the appellate court first? 
Yes. 
Okay, and then it went to the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court said no, we're 
going to give it back to the Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals says, "well, 
there's another issue that needs to be decided first by the trial court." So, that's 
why we're here. 
Yes, that's why we're here. In fact, as far as timing goes, both their appeal and 1 
my cross appeal both were filed in the Supreme Court before an appeal was filed 
in the District Court. So those are both filed up there and then the County filed 
this appeal in the District Court within that 30-day window and the court of 
appeals who then examined that issue decided that this court ought to have the 
first stab at that. First review of the Tax Commission decision. Is it possible 
that your decision may eventually go back up now with the Court of Appeals on 
the one that's kind of staying there and just hanging in the air until we're done? 
Yeah, it could happen that way. 
So, basically, you're telling me that my decision is going to be reviewed because 
it's already on appeal? 
It's already on appeal. j 
Even though I haven't made one yet. 
Yes. Again, it's not certain, but that's the proceeding as it currently sits. 
Well, we could certainly save a lot of time here and I could just say whatever's I 
been sentenced and said and just let it, let the appellate court go. 
Let it go. I'll tell you one of the issues... 1 
Apparently, that isn't what the appellate court wants, however. 
Yeah, it's not, and maybe to inform the court of what was briefed with the court 
of appeals a little bit. Petitioners or landowners. . . sorry, I refer to them as 
landowners. They made the same arguments to them that they made to this court 
which is, you know, if the district court management would go away anyway, it 
was improperly filed and the wrong rules of procedure. Necessary parties | 
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weren't joined. Same exact issues raised to you, and, so, just keep it and ignore 
the District Court action. And the County briefed an issue regarding the 
constitutional right that the counties have. . . or that anybody has, any taxpayer 
or county has. . . to supplement the record. In essence, the statutory scheme the 
way it currently sits and the way it was amended even into the Constitution a few 
years ago was to allow litigants before the Tax Commission, if they're unhappy 
with the results, to appeal the District Court, as well as the Supreme Court. But 
appeal the District Court and one of the purposes of doing that would be so that 
that party can supplement the record with additional evidence. Evidence that can 
then be reviewed and considered by the Court of Appeals. So, the appeal to this 
court wasn't happenstance. It wasn't the kind of a situation where they appealed 
and we appealed and "oh, shoot" we're in both places. Let's just take a short cut 
and go all the way to the court of appeals and stay there." The reason the County 
wants to be here, and the reason we're defending this and the reason we've asked 
for this court's jurisdiction and I assume the reason the Tax Commission's 
requested assignment to a tax judge, which is your honor, is so that for us is so 
that we can supplement the record. There's one narrow issue that the Tax 
Commission decided they didn't have sufficient evidence on in their decision. 
They said, "Well, we know how to get to this bar, but this last little bit, and I 
don't know how , but the last little bit. We don't know that 
sufficient evidence was given to us on this last issue and so we're going to, kind 
of, throw our hands up on the air and what they did was divide by ten. We're 
just going to. . . we know how to value every acre up until the final ten acre 
building envelope that these mansions can go in. After that, we don't know 
exactly what to do with that 10-acre building envelope, so let's take each acre 
and divided by 10. That's the issue that we'd like to supplement the record on. 
Help this court do what the Tax Commission felt it couldn't do and decide how 
to value individual acres within a 10-acre building envelope of a whole 160-acre 
parcel of ground. How to value that last 10 acres? In our opinion, if we went to 
the Supreme Court as our court of appeals right now, perhaps that issue still 
might not be sufficiently vetted and the facts provided. So, that's why we're 
here. And that's why we've asked for this court . 
Judge I So, there's a motion to intervene, is that what I see here? A motion to intervene? 
Lowe I You have a motion to intervene and a motion to dismiss. And those are the two 
motions I think pending before the court and then, I guess... 
Judge [While you're up, do you want to address the motion to intervene. 
Lowe I'd love to. In our brief- and I'll say it here as well - a motion to intervene is 
not necessary. This is an appeal and under the rules of appellate procedure the 
parties below are parties above. If you think this through, the normal rules of 
appellate procedure, if a party appeals a case to the Supreme Court, the other 
party, the appellees do not need to file a motion to intervene. They are already 
parties to the case. 
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1 don't object to it 
No, I don't object to it. I guess I object to his characterization if it's 
characterized as . 
Are you aware of anyone objecting to it. 
No. I don't think Tax Commission objects either. 
Well, you mean object to the. . . 
. . . the motion to intervene. 
I don't, yeah, I don't think it's necessary. They're already parties in the fact that 
the appeal was made. I'm concerned that if you grant a motion to intervene that 
somehow you'll be implying that they have expanded rights. That they don't. . . 
that they haven't already reserved by filing their own appeal in district court or 
filing for cross appeal. Since those appellate procedures are in District Court. 
So I think the Tax Commission concern and we would request that you would 
deny their motion to intervene because it's. . . 
Do you see the case as being the same case that the Tax Commission handled 1 
initially. 
Yes. 
So, were they parties in that case. j 
Yes. 
They are also parties on the appellate case? 1 
Yes. 
So, you're saying they don't need to intervene because it's the same case. 
Yes. But, since they hadn't raised their own issues as to our appeal. Or, I mean, 
as to the commission's decision, arguably I think their role here in this particular 
case would be limited to supporting and defending the Commission's decision. 
So, despite what Mr. Lowe says about allowing additional information to come. 1 
You say they can't do that now. Bring in additional information? 
No, I think, certainly you can make arguments and present new factual issues but 
you cannot expand the matter beyond what was addressed below. And, I think 
clearly Mr. Lowe addressed below that he thinks the value of this particular party 
should be "X" and the Commission ruled that it should be "Y" and he has the 
right to bring the facts and arguments as to why the Commission was wrong on | 
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J that particular point. The landowners in this case, for whatever reason, did not 
file their own appeal in district court nor prosecute it and so I am not so certain 
that they can make arguments beyond what the Commission already decided. 
They went directly to the Court of Appeals? 
1 They did. 1 
1 So, you're saying because they went directly to the court of appeals that any 
arguments that they might have raised in the court of appeals I can't consider 
here? 
Potentially "yes", your honor. Now, whether or not they would still have the 
right to raise those issues that they've addressed and they want to rely upon the 
record in that appeal, I guess I'll have to address that when it, when the Supreme 
Court rests that or court of appeals lifts its stay. 
So, where's their opportunity to bring in new information or new evidence or 
Mr. Lopes says it's such an important part of the process. 
Typically, it happens one of two ways, your honor, you either both file appeals 1 
to District Court or, in the case where Mr. Lowe instigated the appeal there they 
were certainly welcome to the rules of appellate procedure to file a cross appeal. 
And I'm not saying they could not have done that. . . and they certainly could 
have. They didn't. . . which creates this unfortunate situation and I'm not sure 
we could fully address here today at today's hearing. But, yes, it does create a 
problem because, if for whatever reason they chose to file this intervention and it 
goes to a simple cross appeal and they raise their own issue before you. And if 
had had happened I think the Commission would be certainly glad to let them 
argue their own issues here. 
But now the time has passed and they can't raise it. 1 
That is correct, your honor. And I recognize fully this is a difficult situation and 
I agree with you that, unfortunately, is an unnecessary situation. I think we 
could have easily avoided it by simply just filing a cross appeal. We could be 
having our status conference today addressing how the appeal should proceed 
and we should set the discovery and then the trial should be held and so forth. 
That they've chosen to go this what I consider to be somewhat of a strange route 
and argue that this is somehow some civil complaint that needs to be filed and 
should have been filed and they need to intervene which seems to me just 
counter to what the statutes indicate and they should have simply filed the rules 
of appellate procedure and all of these issues would have been avoided. 
Mr. Lowe, anything further? 1 
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Yeah, I appreciate Mr. Bodily's statements there. When I indicated that I did not 
object. What was . . . the end of my sentence was going to be I don't object to 
the Osborns or any of the other taxpayers participating in this appeal to the 
1 extent authorized by the rules of appellate procedure. Certainly, an intervention 
formally is unnecessary as argued in our brief. The concern that we have is. . . 
maybe to elucidate a little further what Mr. Bodily said. We have filed a petition 
for review in this court in order to preserve the right to supplement the record for 
the issue that we have raised. Counsel for Petitioner, or for landowners have not. 1 
So . . . 
So what cuts off their right t o . . . 1 
The 30 days. 1 
So, is that a rule. 
Yeah. 
. . . of civil procedure. 
Rule of appellate procedure. 
Okay, but what you're saying that the Rules of Appellate Procedure control the 
District Court in an appeal from the Tax Commission. 
Yeah, nothing could be clearer. 
So it's just a standard, it's a standard jurisdictional one-month period of time? 1 
Yeah, I don't know how many appellate opinions we've seen where they've said 1 
this wasn't filed on time, we have no jurisdiction to consider this matter. 
You're saying that the District Court on an appeal from the Tax Commission is 1 
covered by that rule? 
Yeah. 
Where is that? 
59-1-602 is a statute that indicates that the Rules of Appellate Procedure apply. 1 
And then we look at the Rules of Appellate Procedure, that's where you find, the 
rule that indicates that appeals must be filed within 30 days of the decision 
below. So while we have preserved our opportunity to supplement the record for 
the issue that we have raised, the short way of saying it is that the landowners 
have not. 
Now do they raise any issues when they took their appeal? 
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1 They raised a legal issue, an issue of law, not an issue of fact. 
1 Okay. And when they appealed to the Supreme Court, any new issues or is that 1 
all together? 
Yeah, no, it's just one appeal, the Supreme Court , and it's just one legal 1 
issue that they've raised that they want the Court of Appeals to reverse the Tax 
Commission on. No issues of fact, they haven't filed anything with this Court to 
request supplementing the record with this Court, so in the County's opinion, 
and our position is, that the record as far as they're concerned is cemented in. 
They've got as much evidence in their behalf as they want or need or desire to 
preserve. The County, on the other hand, does have some additional evidence, 
not much, but some additional evidence it would like to put forth. 
And they should be able to rebut that? j 
Yeah, certainly, they'd be able to rebut what we bring in. They can cross j 
examine the witness if we bring in a witness. 
And maybe even bring in their own evidence to the contrary. 
Uh, the more we go along that line, for example, one issue here is that the Tax 1 
Commission did not rely on their appraiser at all in rendering its decision. So if 
the time came before this Court that the landowners wanted to bring in their 
appraiser and have him testify again, I'd probably object and say that's beyond 
what we've appealed. There's nothing that gives you that right to do that, so. It 
depends on how close it gets to rebutting versus bringing in new evidence. 
You say you're going to bring in evidence regarding this last portion and try to 1 
fill in the gaps that apparently weren't filled in earlier. Shouldn't they be able to 
rebut that whatever way they can? 
Rebut, yes. 
So that, I mean you could bring in a new witness to rebut the testimony. There's 1 
no limit as to what, that you have to keep your old witnesses do you? 
No. I think you're correct on that, Your Honor, But would only go to that last, 1 
for example, here we've got talking about the ten acres. It would only go 
to those last ten acres. 
Has there been discovery on those issues? 1 
There has been. There's been full discovery. Honestly, I don't know that there 1 
will be more discovery required in this court proceedings. 
Well, what if they want to take discovery? J 
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[They would certainly have that right. And we would certainly have that right. 
So, yeah, that may occur. I don't know if it wilL 
Mr. Bodily, do you agree with all that? 
I do, Your Honor. j 
Okay. 
That's the issue. Do you want to stop there? j 
| Yeah, let's stop there and hear what you all have to say about that. 
Your Honor, my name is Maxwell Miller. I'd turn the time over in a moment to j 
I Mr. Cook of our office, but I wanted to preface my remarks, because I think both 
I Mr. Bodily and Mr. Lowe have misrepresented something important to this 
! court. The question was, is it the same thing before the Supreme Court before 
this court and both of them said yes, and the answer is no. An appeal to the 
Supreme Court by the property owners is an appeal as any appeal to the Supreme 
Court on the record, on the record before the Tax Commission. To the contrary, 
Mr. Lowe wants a trial de novo before this Court and a trial de novo and 601 
specifically says it does not mean a trial on the record. It's defined that way. It, 
of course, is directly repugnant to his argument that the Rules of Appellate 
Procedure apply and I have done many cases in the Tax Court on a trial de novo 
and no Tax Court in this state has ruled that in a trial de novo the rules of the 
appellate procedure apply. Essentially, if this court took jurisdiction it would be 
depriving the property owners of their right to an appeal on an issue that may 
moot their trial. Besides, there is an issue as to whether they're even entitled to 
be here. Under 602, it says an aggrieved party appearing before the commission 
or county whose tax revenues are affected by the decision may at that party's 
option - and I stress the word, "option" - petition for judicial review in the 
District Court pursuant to this section or - and I stress the word, "or" - in the 
Supreme Court. Before the county filed a petition for a trial de novo in this 
court, it filed a cross appeal in the Supreme Court. And by application of 602, 
they are foreclosed from going to this court because the statute says they have an 
option, and they are trying to implement both ends when the statute says they 
cannot. j 
I believe the issues related to the motion to intervene are relatively 1 
uncontroverted. If the rules of appellate procedure govern ihe motion to 
intervene, then the Osborns as well as the six other Wolf Creek Ranch property 
owners are already parties to the case. In any event, Wasatch County nor the 
Tax Commission has objected to the Osborns' participation as intervenors in this 
matter. 
One point that needs to be clarified is although Wasatch County refers to this 
matter as an appeal, what they've requested is a trial de novo under Utah Code | 
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Annotated 59-1-601, which is statutorily defined as an original, independent 
proceeding and not a review of the record. And so, although they bring in terms 
of their requesting an appeal before the District Court, what they're really 
requesting is a whole new trial, and, in that regard, the Rules of Civil Procedure 
apply to a request for a new trial, and not the Rules of Appellate Procedure 
which the issues kind of bleed over into the Motion to Dismiss on the issue. j 
So, there's really not any controversy over whether they should intervene. The 
real controversy is whether the Osborns as well as the other Wolf Creek Ranch 
property owners are in at this time. 
Another point of clarification is the reason that the Osborns as well the other 
Wolf Creek Ranch property owners didn't file a cross petition in this matter is 
because they never wanted to be before the District Court. They didn't choose to 
exercise their rights to a trial de novo before this court. 
Read that passage again that you read about 
About a trial do novo. j 
The either or. 1 
So, Utah Code Annotated 59-1-602 states that any aggrieved party appearing 1 
before the Commission or County whose tax revenues are affected by the 
decision. 
So, it could be any aggrieved party or the County. . . 1 
Correct. 
Who is negatively affected by the 
Correct. 1 
So, in this case we have the County and we have some people who think they are 
aggrieved parties. Is that right? 
Correct. We have.. .the issue in this case is property tax assessment on 7 parcels 
of real property located in Wasatch County. Essentially, what this matter boils 
down to is these parcels are 160-acre parcels that were historically used as 
farmland for grazing sheep and cattle and there's a conservation easement of 150 
acres of the property so there's a 10-acre building envelope and the issue relates 
to the property owners have disturbed one acre and so that one acre is removed 
from assessment under the Farmland Assessment Act and determining what 
value that one acre is essentially the controversy in this matter and what they're 
seeking as far as their trial de novo is to adjudicate the property rights of the 
Osborns as well as the 6 other property owners that were parties to the tax | 
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commission proceeding. 
So, you're saying that there's an either/or proposition. They need their election 1 
by going into the appellate court? 
Correct. 
And, therefore, there's nothing to do here. 
Correct. If what they're seeking is an appeal. An appeal is governed by Section 
59-1-602 which indicates that it is an option. You can either appeal to the Utah 
Court of Appeals, the Utah Supreme Court or the Utah District Court. If an 
appeal is made to the Utah District Court under Section 59-1-602 then the Rules 
of Appellate Procedure and the District Court sits as an appellate court in those 
circumstances. Whereas, if you file for a trial de novo under a different section 
which is 59-1-601, the rules of civil procedure apply and you must file the rules 
of civil procedure to invoke the district court's jurisdiction for a new trial. So, 
there's essentially two different avenues that you can take depending on what 
statute you're attempting to invoke the district court's jurisdiction under. If 
you're attempting to invoke this court's jurisdiction for a trial de novo you're 
under 59-1-601 the rules of civil procedure apply. If you're trying to invoke the 
district court's appellate jurisdiction then you file under 59-6-102. 
And what was done? 
They've essentially blended the two statutes together so in their petition for 1 
review they say they're filing under 59-6-101 and 59-1-602. And now the 
problem is if that if you are under 59-1-601 to invoke the court's jurisdiction you 
have to file a new complaint and the rules of civil procedure apply. Otherwise, 
the situation would be unworkable because Utah Rules of Appel late Procedure 
don't allow for entry of new evidence, new discovery and it is also important to 
note that in Wasatch County's petition for review they've asked for a new 
remedy which wasn't raised before the Tax Commission. It seems clear that the 
Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure don't allow for new remedies. 
So, he, Mr. Lowe has filed a petition for judicial review. He asks for an 1 
independent proceeding in the form of a trial de novo. And you say that when he 
filed that he had already made an election to pursue the matter on appeal. 
Correct. Correct. The Wasatch. . . or, Wolf Creek Ranch Property Owners filed 1 
for judicial review in the Supreme Court. Wasatch County then filed a cross 
appeal. 
Were they filed on the same day, or, who filed first. 
The Wolf Creek Ranch Property Owners filed first in the Utah Supreme Court, 1 
then Wasatch County filed a cross appeal in the Supreme Court and then a day or | 
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two later they filed for a trial de novo in this court. 
1 Never withdrawing their cross appeal or anything like that. ; 
1 Correct. 
And in the meantime the Supreme Court had overruled the Court of Appeals. 
| Correct 1 
Which then sent it back here. j 
These stayed the appeal pending what's going to happen in this 
court. 
! So, what do you think I should do? 
A reading of the plain language of the statute would require dismissal because j 
essentially the Osborns, as well as the 6 other Wolf Creek Ranch Property 
owners weren't made parties to this District Court case so they didn't have an 
opportunity to file a cross complaint in this action because they were served with 
process. They were never properly joined as parties in this case. Wasatch 
County's argument for that is that they are already automatically a part of this 
case because the rules of appellate procedure apply. But, clearly, by the plain 
language of the statute, that there's a distinction between requesting to invoke 
the District court's jurisdiction - appellate jurisdiction - pursuant to a trial de 
novo. If Wasatch County is requesting a trial de novo, the manner in which the 
invoked under the rule of civil procedure. In that event the Osborns and 
the other Wolf Creek Ranch property owners weren't properly joined and, 
therefore, this court lacks jurisdiction over that issue and the petition for review 
requesting a trial de novo should be dismissed. If what they're really asking for 
is an appeal pursuant to 59-1-602 to invoke the appellate jurisdiction of this 
Court theyVe, there's no jurisdiction either because they've already elected to 
file an appeal with the Utah Supreme Court. It's clear in 59-1-601, it states "in 
addition to the jurisdiction granted in Section 63g-4-402 which is the 
Administrative Procedures Act and that relates to the manner in which you file 
for a trial de novo following an informal adjudicative proceeding before the Tax 
Commission and that manner is filing, it says a petition for, the petition for 
judicial review of informal adjudicative proceedings shall be a complaint 
governed by the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. And so the purpose of 59-1-601 
is to enlarge the district court's jurisdiction in the context of a trial de novo to 
include formal as well as informal adjudicative proceedings before the Tax 
Commission and the manner in which you do so is under the Rules of Civil 
Procedure by filing a new complaint and initiating an original independent 
proceeding. 
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Thank you. Mr. Lowe do you want to respond to that? 
Yeah, if I could. It sounds like we're kind of addressing everything now. The 
either/or argument that you just heard was never made to this court until the day. 
It wasn't briefed; it wasn't raised in the briefing of the parties. That was raised 
in the briefing to the court of appeals. The court of appeals addressed that issue. | 
Well. . . we assume they addressed that issue. They issued a very short decision 
and declined to grant the relief requested by landowners which is that because 
the appeal. . . the County's appeal to the court of appeals was one day before the 
County's appeal to the district court, that somehow was an exercise in an option 
that foreclosed the other option. It'd be a little bit difficult. . . 
Well, let's just review this. I mean, I think everybody would have to admit that 1 
what's taking place in this case is not the typical situation. As I understand it. . . 
someone who is an aggrieved party or County that feels its revenues are 
impacted by a decision of the Tax Commission can do one of two things. They 
can either go to the District Court or they can go to the Supreme Court. If they 
go to the District Court they have two options. One option is to appeal 
No. 
No, you don't think so. 1 
No, you've been misstated the law. 
Okay, what do you think the rule is. j 
Okay, the rule is that. . . and honestly, maybe the most articulate on this is Mr. 
Bodily, but let me first do my stab at it. The rule is that previously you could 
only appeal the District Courts for informal Tax Commission proceedings, or 
from informal Tax Commission proceedings. The statute was amended to allow 
appeal to District Court for also formal Tax Commission proceedings. That's 
the change in the law and then the law specifically says when you appeal the 
District Court. . . all appeals to District Court are trial de novo. All of them. 
There is no such thing as you acting as only an appeal, appellate court on the 
records or an appellate court for a trial de novo. All appeals to the District Court 
are trial de novo. And it says that the court shall conform. . . that's the word. 
The District Court's shall conform to the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. So 
that's the only. . . you don't different hats you can put on here. I'm going to sit 
as a trial de novo district court kind of judge and here is an appellate court judge 
and only looking at the record. In both sections, 59-1-601 and 59-1-602 it refers 
to this court as a same appellate court. Even in 601. . . and by the way this is an 
argument that's never been advanced. . . 
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novel argument being created for your ears. Even in 59-1-601, which 
I'm just hearing today for the first, this has never been argued anywhere, 
either refused of the court of appeals or this court in the briefing. At 59-
1-601 is the de novo statute and 59-1-602 is an appeal statute. That's 
brand spankin' new today. Even in 59-1-601 it requires the commission 
to certify a record of its proceedings to the District Court. And this 
Court is then to do a trial de novo, which means an original independent 
proceeding, and does not mean a trial de novo on the record. Essentially 
it means you can bring in new evidence and then at 602 it specifically 
says, you are to apply the rules of appellate procedure. So that the 
county, first of all would object to a new argument made to this court 
that hasn't been briefed. When it was fully briefed and argued before 
the Supreme court, our Court of Appeals when it was poured over, the 
constitution, the amendments to the constitution and those rights are 
brought into play and argued and set forth and they did what they did 
there. Here, you don't have any of the benefits of that. There are many 
practical and constitutional reasons why these statutes ought to be read 
that way, but also that's the way they have been read by the Court of 
Appeals. The Constitution gives us that right to appeal to the District 
Court, to supplement the record. There's not two different appeals, 
there's only one. As far as the relief requested, again this is a new 
argument today that either the court ought to dispose of the matter for us 
failing to join indispensible parties, which is applying Rules of Civil 
Procedure, which just don't fit. Or, the Court should deny this appeal, 
simply because the County previously exercised its right to cross-appeal 
in the Supreme Court. Those are two angles that, again, were not 
brought up in the briefing. The Court of Appeals has already held, at 
least implicitly, that we have the right to do what we have done. If you 
think about it there's some good sense for that. We didn't choose for 
them to file their appeal in the Supreme Court. They chose to do that. 
The statute gives both parties the right to appeal. You say, you guys can 
appeal to the Supreme Court or to District Court, whatever you want. 
They exercise their right to appeal to Supreme Court. Once somebody 
does that, either party does that, the other side has a deadline. If we 
don't cross-appeal and preserve our issues for appeal, they're foreclosed 
as well. So their appeal to the Supreme Court forces our hand. If we 
want to have standing in the Supreme Court to say anything, contrary to 
the tax commission's decision, we have to file a cross-appeal. Whether 
we want to be there or not, we have to file a cross-appeal. And then the 
decision is also given to me under the statute. You can also appeal 
wherever you want to appeal. Well, I chose to appeal; my County 
chooses to appeal to the District Court. 
Judge Do you have to file a cross-appeal? Couldn't you file instead a Motion 
to Stay Proceedings in the Supreme Court so that you can proceed to 
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exercise your rights in the trial court? 
I could, and I did. The difficulty is, I guess what your assuming is that I 
could file the Motion to Stay... 
| You didn't file a Motion to Stay in the Supreme Court. Did you? 1 
I did and was granted. 
Was that filed before your filed your cross-appeal? 1 
It was filed after. 
So, you filed your cross-appeal, then you come in and say, on second 
thought, I want to have the District Court hear this. 
Not on second thought. 
Why didn't you file just a motion to stay the time running through your 
cross-appeal and say that you want to proceed in the District Court? 
Instead of doing what the other side says in this case is, elect your 
alternative and that is to proceed in the Supreme Court. 
For the extremely simple reason, your honor, that there is no rule that 
would afford me the protection of saying that the Motion for Stay tolls 
the 30 days. Nothing gives anybody that protection. If you file a 
Motion for Stay, while that motions pending, and in fact, the Court 
of Appeals a couple of months to issue their decision on that. There's 
nothing that grants me the protection that says a motion for stay tolls, 
there are similar rules and the Rules of Civil Procedure, for example, on 
a motion for new trial, or a motion to adjust the findings of fact, let's 
say that tolls, or stays the time to file an appeal. There is no protection. 
And you don't think you could have asked the Court for, the Supreme 1 
Court, the Utah Court, some kind of expedited decision on that? 
Yeah. I could have asked for the world, your honor. I could have asked 1 
for my best case scenario. 
Well, the point is, the point is the time....ticking you've got, what over I 
30 days to respond? And you filed your Motion for Stay and expedited 
the and court doesn't respond in a timely way, you can still come 
in at the last minute and file down here. 
Yeah, but then what's the difference. For example, say I had filed. 
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I The difference is, is that you wouldn't appear to have elected your 
remedies. Other than, or the fact that you were worried about the time. ! 
1 I still haven't elected my remedies by going to Supreme Court. j 
You haven't... 
If I had filed in... 
How do you interpret the word or? 
Either or meaning, they can choose where they want to go, I can choose 
where I want to go. But the statute doesn't do is help anybody figure 
out, what if the parties disagree? What if one side wants to go here, and 
the other side wants to go there? There is no outline of how that dispute 
is resolved. And which court goes first and how that's done. In fact, in 
the briefing before. 
Alright. Well I think I understand your position on that. Let's hear I 
from Mr. Bodily, if he has any insight on the, on this particular aspect 
Can I just, this one issue, on if, we had filed District Court first, like the 1 
Court was indicating. If, just assume that the County had first filed its 
District Court appeal and then the time, being the 30 days is coming up 
and then we file our cross-appeal in the Court of Appeals. How would 
that change this scenario? Even then, someone could argue, this 
perhaps is being argued here today, for the first time, but the County 
changes its mind, decided as District Court review was a waste of time 
and wasn't worth its while. And so it chose appeal to the Court of 
Appeals. The same scenario could be argued, no matter what happens 
in that process, without any guarantee that we could preserve our rights 
and knowing that the subject m jurisdictional issue, which can 
leave the Court of Appeals no discretion on whether an issue is 
preserved before it. The County has no choice but to preserve its 
standing in the Appellate Court, and the Appellate Court agreed with 
that and stayed it, so this Court could be issue first. Thank you. 
Thank you, your honor. I do want to clarify this is not the first time that I 
this issue has arised. This certainly is a little bit different because the 
way the parties have decided to approach it. But because of the or 
situation, quite often you have, well not quite often, but I have seen at J 
least three circumstances, this will be the fourth, where one party 
chooses to file first in the Supreme Court and the other party chooses to 
go to the District Court and my understanding is that in all cases the 
Appellate Court defer to the District Court to pursue the appeal there. 
And then once the proceedings are brought, if they are eventually 
brought back, and appealed to the appellate level, then the appeals are | 
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1 typically consolidated at that time period. So I think it is appropriate 
that the County's preserve their cross-appeal in the Supreme Court j 
while they pursue their District Court appeal. While I also think it j 
would have been appropriate for the taxpayers, the land owners to also 
preserve their cross-appeal in the District Court, even though they may j 
have not have been here. So that all parties have their issues preserved, 
so the Tax Commission knows who is contesting what part of the 
decision and we're familiar as to who's contesting what, where and 
ultimately, the Supreme Court or the Court of Appeals decides who's 
going to go first. And as I indicated earlier, typically, at least my 
experience is that they defer to the District Court. 1 don't believe there's 
anything out of the ordinary in that particular situation. And I think the 
Court of Appeals spoke fairly... 
Well what about the situation, where as here, the, one party appeals the 
Tax Commission decision to the Supreme Court and then comes back 
and appeals also to this Court for trial de novo, on that issue? Is that 
something you see happening? 
I have not seen that issue. 
Isn't that what we have here? 
No. 
I thought we did. I mean, I thought the County, I'm looking at a petition 1 
for judicial review that the County submitted here. I guess, I don't 
know when it was filed, it was dated on the 25th of April and that was 
after they already filed an appeal, or a cross-appeal in the Supreme 
Court. Isn't it? 
Your honor, they way I would view that is, that you have the land j 
owners who filed an appeal with the Utah Supreme Court. The 
Counties not knowing, ultimately, whether the District Court will 
maintain jurisdiction or whether the Supreme Court will retain 
jurisdiction... J 
appeals. Filed simply a protective cross-appeal, which I think is J 
appropriate. And a simple way to address the situation. And then they 
pursued their District Court appeal, of which they entitled to do so. I do 
not see there's been an election on the party of the County, by simply 
filing a protective cross-appeal in the Supreme Court. And so I disagree 
with you on... 
Well, but they've done both haven't they? 
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1 They have done, they've filed a protective cross-appeal. 
1 And doesn't the statute say they can do one or the other? 1 
The statute says you can choose to file in the Supreme Court and...you 
could choose... 
No, it says or.... 
Or you can choose to file in the District Court. I do not believe that the 
County's filing of the protective cross-appeal in the Supreme Court 
somehow is an election of remedies at that point. I don't believe they 
have an option but to pr... 
! Is there a case that says that that's not the... 
Well you do... | 
That it's not an election of remedy. 1 
You do, you do have that issue and it was argued. 1 
Right. 
Before the Court of Appeals and they obviously didn't seem to find it 1 
was compelling enough to rule on it, and hence they deferred to this 
District Court as they have in all other cases, for you to administer this 
appeal that you have before you. 
Well, what, I mean they, are they, they may be just asking me to say, 1 
they've elected remedies and I don't have jurisdiction to proceed on the 
matter. J 
And certainly we don't what, what is in their minds. I didn't find any 1 
specific direction for you to rule on that first so that they could.... 
And there's no case other than what they did here that you can point to J 
that says that that's not an election of remedies. That they can do both. 
I have not researched that issue, quite frankly, your honor. 1 
Well and Mr. Lowe says that it's been raised here for the first time, I 
maybe that's something that we ought to let you do. But, I'm troubled 
by that. It seems to me that there are a number of things that the County 
could have done here. They could have filed, it seems to me, here first, 
and then filed a cross-appeal afterwards saying, we're just filing our 
cross-appeal to protect ourselves in the Appellate Court. We've already 
got a case pending in the District Court and we're happy to respond on J 
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the merits in the Appellate Court, if that's what the Appellate Court 
wants us to do. I would think they could have done that. They didn't do 
that. They didn't ask for a stay of the Appellate Court proceedings, 
pending resolution of the matter here. It said they filed it on the merits 
in the Appellate Court and then they come back and file on their merits \ 
here. Seems to me that's, that's some election of remedies took place in 
| the process. It seems, I don't know? I'm interested in whether there is I 
some case authority one way or the other. 
! Well, I'm not familiar with anything in the state of Utah, your honor. 
So I can't respond to that. I will say that there were additional issues 
with respect to the Supreme Court appeal because neither party was 
noticed by the land owners, so there was some time concerns on the part 
of the County, I'm certain. But to me, I simply just view it as a 
protective cross-appeal, and their intent was always to pursue a remedy 
here before the District Court. But we'll certainly bnef that if you 
would like me to research that further. 
Let's hear what the other side; I think Mr. Maxwell Miller wanted to say 
something to me about that. 
Yes your honor, I did. I think Mr. Lowe has, again, misrepresented to 
the Court. He said that this issue was the first time before this Court. If 
you look at page twelve footnote three of our memorandum, it says, and 
I quote, "it is clear that this Court has no jurisdiction to adjudicate 
Wasatch County's petition for review, because Wasatch County filed a 
cross-petition for review of the Tax Commission's final decision in the 
Utah Court of Appeal on April 24, 2008 and then filed its petition for 
review on April 25, 2008 in this Court. Utah Code Ann. 59-1-602 
provides any aggrieved party appearing before the Commission or 
County whose tax revenues are affected by the decision may at that 
party's option, petition for judicial review in the District Court pursuant 
to this section or in the Supreme Court or the Court of Appeals pursuant 
to Section 59-1-610." Wasatch County having elected to file its cross-
petition for review in the Utah Court of Appeals cannot then invoke the 
jurisdiction of this Court by filing a petition for review. Under the 
statute, when Wasatch County elected to invoke the jurisdiction of the 
Utah Court of Appeals where the controversy is currently pending, 
Wasatch County's statutory option was exercised and no jurisdiction 
existed to come to this Court. This is not the first time that is argued; 
that is in our brief 
Alright, thank you. That was the brief that you filed where? 1 
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In this Court. 
In this court. Quite a . Thank you. 
1 One more point is that also Mr. Lowe argued that the parties have an 
option. Yes, one party has an option to appeal to the Supreme Court and j 
maybe another party has an option to go to the District Court. But in j 
this case, we're having Wasatch County trying to pursue both options, 
simultaneously. And the statute explicitly says you cannot do that. 
Alright, thanks. 
If I may just address briefly, the argument that's been addressed that 
somehow there's two distinct appeals to the District Court. One under 
601 and one under 602, I certainly never seen it interpreted that way, 
your honor. I think counsel for the County is correct, in that regard, 
that this certainly years ago, everyone had the right to informal 
administrative adjudicated proceedings to go to District Court. And for 
; formal proceedings your only right was to go to the Supreme Court. 
That was changed by the statute and hence they at 601, which 
granted jurisdiction to the District Court for all decisions of the 
Commission whether they be informal or formal. And it's specifically 
provided in all appeals; the record of the Tax Commission would be, 
would be sent to the District Court and certified to the District Court. 
And in 602, simply indicates who may file that appeal to the District 
Court and it also specifies that for appeals, the proper procedure to file 
that appeal is the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, which was followed 
in this case. We believe that makes sense, given the situation here, 
where most appeals at the Tax Commission are formal proceedings. 
So parties have had trials and evidence and arguments and decisions, 
everybody's place on notice as to what the issues are, it simply a matter 
of narrowing those issues that are truly contested by the appeal process 
and once we're here we can decide how we're going to proceed. In 
some cases, taxpayers chose to rely upon record and do so by 
stipulation. And other cases we simply have a new evidentiary hearing 
on those issues that they dispute. And, so we don't believe there's a 
need to file a complaint. We don't believe there's a need to file an 
intervention. If you do want to raise your own issues on the appeal, 
simply file a cross-appeal. Any other questions? 
Thank you, no. The role, despite the footnote you feel like you are I 
caught with that contention, I take it? 
Yes, if you look at the taxpayers' motion, it never raises that issue. 
Well...what about, you're saying it's in a response? And it's therefore 1 
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1 you don't have to pay any attention to it? 
No, no, not in the motion. It is only raised in a footnote in a ! 
memorandum. 
Yeah. 
The motion does not request to relief that is argued in the footnote of 
the memorandum. It seems like that the memorandum ought to 
1 somehow fit within the four corners of the motion. 
Well, how much time do you need to respond to that? 
Well, if I could just first, and I understand the Court has some 1 
problems or some difficulties with this issue and you want some help 
with it. There's a good reason, however to hold, even today, that the 
law of this case has already been established. That that is an invalid 
argument. The argument that is in a footnote and not in the motion, 
and nowhere really addressed in the memorandum other than a 
footnote, is fully briefed before the Court of Appeals. It was fully 
argued by them and fully briefed by the County. And the Court of 
Appeals declined, or overruled the objection raised by the taxpayers. 
I don't see a hold in this short opinion that you've given me that says, 1 
one way or the other that this, that or should be read to be and. 
No, it's not. So what you have though is a County saying, your honor, 
Court of Appeals, please stay this until District Court's done. And you 
have taxpayers saying, no, don't stay it, because the County has elected 
their remedy essentially, using Mr. Bodily's language. Have elected 
their remedy and so it needs to stay here and not go back. 
Well, you're giving me your reading of their decision and I think 1 
someone here, maybe it was Mr. Bodily already indicated that you're 
not sure really what the Appellate Court is think and I agree with 
that..,. 
Well we know what they did though. 
Well? 
We know that they denied the relief requested based on the arguments 1 
made. 
Well, but I don't know what the reason they denied it for, was. And 
that troubles me. So, what I'm going to do, if you would like some 
additional time to brief this, I'll give it to you. If you feel that it's been | 
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1 fully briefed and there is no additional time, I'm ready to rule. 
1 It hasn't been briefed at all. 
Okay. 
By either party. 
Well they say they've given you at a least a footnote with their 1 
position. How long will it take you to respond on that end? 
Your honor, it is already briefed for the Court of Appeals, I could have 
a copy of that to this Court within a week. 
Okay and how much time do you need to reply? 
Five days. 
Okay, so we're looking at two weeks, okay. Let's do that. Does that 
fit with your schedule of ? 
Yes, your honor, I don't think I'll necessarily need to file something 
since it has been previously briefed. I've seen the arguments of the 
parties before the Court of Appeals considered, and I think it's unlikely 
that we'll be filing something, but we'll be here to participate in the 
whole argument, your honor. 1 
Okay. Let's see if we can pick a date sometime between the 29th of J 
July and the like the 4th of August for argument on this. 
If you feel like you've heard enough argument on it and the briefing is 1 
sufficient, your honor, I don't know that we need to come back for that. 
Unless the Court, 
Well, I want to give you a chance if you feel like you; you say you 
haven't had a chance, I don't want you... I 
Well it's not me, so much as, your honor; I don't think the Court has J 
seen all the aspects of that argument made by the counsel today. j 
Well, I'd like you to do whatever you think you need to do. If you 
don't want it, I won't give it to you. We can, I'll rule today. 
I'd like to least have the brief on the record, your honor, but I don't 1 
think we need oral arguments again. 
Well I may want oral arguments, that's why I want to set it so it I 
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doesn't get strung out. ' 
We could do the 28th of July at 9:30? j 
That would be tight; I have to be back in Heber by 11:00. But I think I 
we could probably do that. 
What's the next day or two after that? I 
We could put it on the 30m at 1:30, July 30th. 
And that's worse. That's our District Court date on, there for a law and 1 
motion calendar. It's preliminary hearings on the afternoon calendar. 
Alright, let's do it on the 28th at 9:30. 
Thank you, your honor. 1 
Okay, thank you. j 
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